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INTRODUCTION 
Fashion is one of the world’s most important creative industries. It is the 
major output of a global business with annual U.S. sales of more than $200 
billion—larger than those of books, movies, and music combined.1 Everyone 
wears clothing and inevitably participates in fashion to some degree. Fashion is 
also a subject of periodically rediscovered fascination in virtually all the social 
sciences and the humanities.2 It has provided economic thought with a 
canonical example in theorizing about consumption and conformity.3 Social 
 
1. U.S. apparel sales reached $196 billion in 2007. The U.S. Apparel Market 2007 
Dresses Up . . . Way Up, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 18, 2008 (reporting estimate by the NPD Group). 
Among fashion accessories, considering just one category, handbags, adds another $5 billion 
in sales. Tanya Krim, There’s Nothing “Trivial” About the Purse-suit of the Perfect Bag, 
BRANDWEEK, Mar. 29, 2007 (reporting U.S. sales exceeding $5 billion in 2005). For 
comparison, U.S. publishers had net sales of $25 billion in 2007. Press Release, Ass’n of 
Am. Publishers, AAP Reports Book Sales Rose to $25 Billion in 2007 (Mar. 31, 2008), 
http://www.publishers.org/main/IndustryStats/indStats_02.htm. The motion picture and 
video industry had estimated revenues of $64 billion in 2003. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2003 
SERVICE  ANNUAL  SURVEY,  INFORMATION  SECTOR  SERVICES  (NAICS  51)—ESTIMATED 
REVENUE FOR EMPLOYER  FIRMS:  1998  THROUGH  2003, at 1 tbl.3.0.1, available at 
http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/sas51-1.pdf;  see also M OTION  PICTURE  ASS’N OF AM., 
INC.,  ENTERTAINMENT  INDUSTRY  MARKET  STATISTICS  2007, at 3, available at 
http://www.mpaa.org/USEntertainmentIndustryMarketStats.pdf (reporting U.S. box office 
sales of nearly $10 billion in 2007). The music industry had U.S. revenue, measured at retail, 
of about $10 billion in 2007. RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., 2007 YEAR-END SHIPMENT 
STATISTICS, available at http://www.riaa.com/keystatistics.php. Thus fashion is comparable 
in importance to other core creative industries even if, as seems plausible, some apparel has 
a lower intellectual property content. 
2. See, e.g., LARS SVENDSEN, FASHION: A PHILOSOPHY 7 (John Irons trans., Reaktion 
2006) (“Fashion has been one of the most influential phenomena in Western civilization 
since the Renaissance.”). 
3. See, e.g., Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory 
of Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183 (1950); see also, e.g., Sushil Bikhchandani et al., 
A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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thinkers have long treated fashion as a window upon social class and social 
change.4 Cultural theorists have focused on fashion to reflect on symbolic 
meaning and social ideals.5 Fashion has also been seen to embody 
representative characteristics of modernity, and even of culture itself.6 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine a locus of social life—whether in the arts, the 
sciences, politics, academia, entertainment, business, or even law or morality—
that does not exhibit fashion in some way.7 People flock to ideas, styles, 
methods, and practices that seem new and exciting, and then eventually the 
intensity of that collective fascination subsides, when the newer and hence 
more exciting emerge on the scene. Participants of social practices that value 
innovation are driven to partake of what is “original,” “cutting edge,” “fresh,” 
“leading,” or “hot.” But with time, those qualities are attributed to others, and 
another trend takes shape. This is fashion. The desire to be “in fashion”—most 
 
POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Philip R.P. Coelho & James E. McClure, Toward an Economic 
Theory of Fashion, 31 ECON.  INQUIRY 595 (1993); Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Design 
Innovation and Fashion Cycles, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 771 (1995); Dwight E. Robinson, The 
Economics of Fashion Demand, 75 Q.J. ECON. 376 (1961); George J. Stigler & Gary S. 
Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76, 76 (1977). 
4. See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Dover Publ’n 
1994) (1899); Georg Simmel, Fashion, 10 INT’L Q. 130 (1904), reprinted in 62 AM. J. SOC. 
541 (1957); see also, e.g., QUENTIN BELL, ON HUMAN FINERY (Shocken Books 1976) (1949); 
PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE (Richard 
Nice trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1984) (1979); DIANA CRANE, FASHION AND ITS SOCIAL 
AGENDAS  (2000);  KURT  LANG  &  GLADYS  ENGEL  LANG,  COLLECTIVE  DYNAMICS  465-88 
(1961); PHILIPPE PERROT, FASHIONING THE BOURGEOISIE: A HISTORY OF CLOTHING IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY (Richard Bienvenue trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1994) (1981); JOHN 
RAE, THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF CAPITAL 218-36, 245-76 (Charles Whitney Mixter ed., 
Macmillan Co. 1905) (1834); Bernard Barber & Lyle S. Lobel, “Fashion” in Women’s 
Clothes and the American Social System, 31 SOC. FORCES 124 (1952). 
5. See, e.g., ROLAND  BARTHES,  THE  FASHION  SYSTEM (Matthew Ward & Richard 
Howard trans., Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1983) (1967); JENNIFER  CRAIK,  THE  FACE OF 
FASHION:  CULTURAL  STUDIES IN FASHION  (1994);  FRED  DAVIS,  FASHION,  CULTURE, AND 
IDENTITY (1992); Edward Sapir, Fashion, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 139, 
139-44 (Edwin R.A. Seligman ed., 1931). 
6. See, e.g., JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FOR A CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
SIGN 78 (1981); FASHION AND MODERNITY (Christopher Breward & Caroline Evans eds., 
2005); Herbert Blumer, Fashion: From Class Differentiation to Collective Selection, 10 
SOC. Q. 275 (1969); A.L. Kroeber, On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified 
by Changes of Fashion, 21 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 235 (1919). 
7. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE  THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 283 (Augustus M. 
Kelley 1966) (1759) (“[T]he influence of custom and fashion over dress and furniture is not 
more absolute than over architecture, poetry, and music.”); Jeff Biddle, A Bandwagon Effect 
in Personalized License Plates?, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 375 (1991); Bikhchandani et al., supra 
note 3, at 1010-14; John F. Burnum, Medical Practice à la Mode: How Medical Fashions 
Determine Medical Care, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1220 (1987); B. Peter Pashigian et al., 
Fashion, Styling, and the Within-Season Decline in Automobile Prices, 38 J.L. & ECON. 281 
(1995); Stigler & Becker, supra note 3, at 87; Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: On Academic 
Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2001); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, 
or fashions on Americans.” (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring))). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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visibly manifested in the practice of dress—captures a significant aspect of 
social life, characterized by both the pull of continuity with others and the push 
of innovation toward the new. 
In the legal realm, this social dynamic of innovation and continuity is most 
directly engaged by the law of intellectual property. At this moment, fashion 
itself has the attention of federal policymakers, as Congress considers whether 
to provide copyright protection for fashion design,8 a debate that is sure to 
continue in the face of fashion designers’ many complaints of harm by design 
copyists.9 Despite being the core of fashion and legally protected in Europe, 
fashion design lacks protection against copying under U.S. intellectual property 
law.10 Thus it has seemed sensible to posit that fashion design is relevantly 
different from literature, music, and art, where legal protection from copying is 
thought to be necessary to provide producers an incentive to create.11 Indeed, 
 
8. See Design Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. § 2(a), (d) (2007); Design 
Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. § 2(a), (d) (2007); ABA Section 
of Intellectual Prop. Law, Proposed Resolution 2008 Council-1A (approved Aug.   
9, 2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/annual2008/business-session/ 
2008Council1A.pdf (“Resolved, that the Section of Intellectual Property Law, believing that 
there is sufficient need for greater intellectual property protection than is now available for 
fashion designs, supports, in principle, enactment of federal legislation to provide a new 
limited copyright-like protection for such designs; and now therefore, the Section supports 
enactment of H.R. 2033 . . . or similar legislation.”); see also Eric Wilson, When Imitation’s 
Unflattering, N.Y.  TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, at G4 (describing designers’ efforts to secure 
copyright protection). 
9. For example, an industry-sponsored website collects quotations from designers 
Oscar de la Renta, Dayna Foley, Phillip Lim, Nicole Miller, Zac Posen, Narciso Rodriguez, 
and Diane von Furstenberg, and a video posted to the site quotes top executives at Armani, 
Chanel, Dior, Ferragamo, Hermes, and Marc Jacobs, among others. See Stop Fashion Piracy, 
The Industry Speaks Out, http://www.stopfashionpiracy.com/theindustryspeaks.php (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2009). 
10. Garments are “useful articles” not protected by copyright, except to the extent that 
an article’s expressive component is “separable” from its utility. See infra Part IV.A for an 
explanation and critique of the current copyright regime as applied to fashion. Trademark 
law protects fashion firms’ logos against infringement and counterfeiting. For a discussion 
of trademarks and counterfeiting, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal 
Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 
91 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2005). Design patents provide protection in a few cases, but their 
demanding standards for protection and long lead time make them of limited use for most 
fashion articles. For a useful overview of the law and history of intellectual property 
protection and fashion design, see Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, 
in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 
115 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2006). For a comparative discussion of European copyright for fashion 
design, see Matthew S. Miller, Piracy in Our Backyard: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Implications of Fashion Copying in the United States for the International Copyright 
Community, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 133, 141-44 (2008). 
11. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA.  L.  REV. 1687 (2006); see also  Design 
Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement 
of David Wolfe, Creative Director, Doneger Group), 2006 WL 2127241; Sarah J. Kaufman, 
Note, Trend Forecast: Imitation is a Legal Form of Flattery—Louis Vuitton Malletier v. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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some commentators even suggest that perhaps fashion design is so different 
from other arts that its vitality, or even survival, paradoxically depends on the 
existence of the opposite kind of regime—a culture of tolerated rampant 
copying.12 
This Article enters the debate about intellectual property protection and 
fashion design13—a debate in which the fashion industry finds itself 
divided14—and argues for a limited right against design copying. We set the 
legal policy debate within a reflection on the cultural dynamics of innovation as 
a social practice. Fashion in the realm of dress is a version of a ubiquitous 
phenomenon, the ebb and flow of trends wherein the new ineluctably becomes 
old and then leads into the new. Fashion is commonly thought to express 
individuality, and simultaneously to exemplify conformity. The dynamics of 
fashion lend insight into the dynamics of innovation more broadly. 
Our motivation here is threefold. First, as the most immediate visible 
marker of self-presentation, fashion communicates meanings that have 
individual and social significance. Innovation in fashion creates vocabularies 
for self-expression that relate individuals to social worlds. As with other 
creative goods, intellectual property law plays a role in shaping the quantity 
and the direction of innovation produced by the fashion industry and made 
available for consumption by people who wear clothing—that is, everyone—a 
group larger than those who consume art, music, or books. Second, the fashion 
 
Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 531, 532-35 (2005). 
12. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Fashion Victims: How Copyright Law 
Could Kill the Fashion Industry, NEW  REPUBLIC  ONLINE, Aug. 14, 2007, available at 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/home/News/Detail.aspx?recordid=1188;  see also James 
Surowiecki, The Piracy Paradox, NEW YORKER, Sept. 24, 2007, at 90. But see Julie P. Tsai, 
Comment,  Fashioning Protection: A Note on the Protection of Fashion Designs in the 
United States, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 447 (2005); Diane von Furstenberg, Letter to the 
Editor, Fashion Police, NEW YORKER, Oct. 22, 2007, at 16. 
13. A recent efflorescence of law review commentary features debate on the merits 
and scope of copyright protection for fashion design, in view of the proposed Design Piracy 
Prohibition Act. See, e.g., Shelly C. Sackel, Art Is in the Eye of the Beholder: A 
Recommendation for Tailoring Design Piracy Legislation to Protect Fashion Design and the 
Public Domain, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 473 (2007); Lynsey Blackmon, Comment, The Devil Wears 
Prado: A Look at the Design Piracy Prohibition Act and the Extension of Copyright 
Protection to the World of Fashion, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 107 (2007); Emily S. Day, Comment, 
Double-Edged Scissor: Legal Protection for Fashion Design, 86 N.C. L. REV. 237 (2007); 
Lisa J. Hedrick, Note, Tearing Fashion Design Protection Apart at the Seams, 65 WASH. & 
LEE  L.  REV. 215 (2008); Lauren Howard, Note, An Uningenious Paradox: Intellectual 
Property Protections for Fashion Designs, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS (forthcoming 2009); 
Elizabeth F. Johnson, Note, Interpreting the Scope of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 73 
BROOK. L. REV. 729 (2008); Laura C. Marshall, Note, Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress 
Should Adopt a Modified Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 305 (2007); Brandon Scruggs, Comment, Should Fashion Design Be Copyrightable?, 6 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 122 (2007); Megan Williams, Comment, Fashioning a New 
Idea: How the Design Piracy Prohibition Act Is a Reasonable Solution to the Fashion 
Design Problem, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 303 (2007). 
14. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 8 (noting the “fashion industry’s ongoing debate 
about knockoffs”). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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industry has huge economic importance.15 Getting the economics of this 
industry right is an important challenge that must inform an inquiry into its 
regulation by intellectual property law. Third, the debate over legal protection 
for fashion design connects to a larger debate about how much intellectual 
property protection we want to have.16 
The question of legal protection for fashion design poses the central 
question of intellectual property: the optimal balance between, on the one hand, 
providing an incentive to create new works, and on the other hand, promoting 
the two goals of making existing works available to consumers and making 
material available for use by subsequent innovators. We treat fashion as a 
laboratory to ask this question anew. The fashion trend is a particularly vivid 
manifestation of a general innovation pattern wherein those engaged in 
innovation continually seek after the new and different while, at the same time, 
converging with others on similar ideas. Fashion conspicuously exhibits the 
challenge of providing incentives for individuals to innovate while preserving 
the benefits to innovation of moving in a direction with others. 
This Article offers a new model of consumer and producer behavior 
derived from cultural analysis in an area where consumptive choices are also 
expressive. In fashion we observe simultaneously the participation in collective 
trends and the expression of individuality. Consumers have a taste for trends—
that is, for goods that enable them to move in step with other people. But even 
in fulfilling that taste, they desire goods that differentiate them from other 
individuals. Fashion goods tend to share a trend component, and also to have 
features that differentiate them from other goods within the trend. Consumption 
and production of fashion must be understood with respect to both the trend 
features and the differentiating features. Formalizing these cultural 
observations, we call these two coexisting tastes “flocking” and 
“differentiation.” Fashion puts into relief people’s tendency to flock while also 
differentiating from each other.  
Individual differentiation within flocking is our account of fashion 
behavior. But we can observe versions of this dynamic too in other areas of 
innovation, for example, the production and consumption of books, music, 
film, and other arts. Where innovation is a site of both self-expression and 
social expression, we can see producers and consumers of creative goods 
 
15. See the statistics cited supra note 1. Fashion is the third-largest employer in New 
York, after health care and finance. Rags and Riches, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2004, at 75. 
16. While other analysts have associated fashion with relatively marginal or 
exceptional forms of creativity, such as cuisine, magic, and stand-up comedy, see Raustiala 
& Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1765-74 (discussing fashion as a model for understanding the 
work of chefs and magicians); Daniel B. Smith, Creative Vigilantes: Magicians, Chefs, and 
Stand-Up Comics Protect Their Creations Without the Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2007, 
at 1E (same, for chefs, magicians, and stand-up comics), we see the dynamics of fashion 
innovation as exemplifying those of more paradigmatic creative industries, such as art, 
literature, and music. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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flocking to themes in common, but differentiating themselves within that 
flocking activity.  
The model makes visible an important analytic distinction that is useful for 
thinking about creative goods—the distinction between close copying on one 
hand and participation in common trends on the other hand. Design copying 
must be distinguished from other forms of relation between two designs, which 
may go by any number of names including inspiration, adaptation, homage, 
referencing, or remixing. Our analysis resists elision of close copies and myriad 
other activities that produce, enable, and comprise trends. Goods that are part 
of the same trend are not necessarily close copies or substitutes. Rather, they 
may be efforts to meet the need of consumers for individual differentiation 
within flocking. The well-known fact that “borrowing” is common in 
fashion,17 and might be valuable to fashion innovation, does not itself provide 
support for the permissibility of close copying in fashi
Our theory leads us to favor a legal protection against close copying of 
fashion designs. The proliferation of close copies of a design is not 
innovation—it serves flocking but not differentiation. It is importantly distinct 
from the proliferation of on-trend designs that share common elements, 
inspirations, or references but are nevertheless saliently different from each 
other. With respect to close copies, there is no reason to reject the standard 
justification for intellectual property, that permissive copying reduces 
incentives to create. But this effect must be distinguished from the effects of 
other trend-joining activities, which enable differentiation within flocking. 
They foster and constitute innovation in ways that close copying does not. Thus 
we argue in favor of a legal right that would protect original fashion designs 
from close copies. 
Some readers will no doubt bristle at the implication that Prada, say, ought 
to enjoy better protection for its wares. That reaction misunderstands the 
project. Because the current legal regime denies design protection while 
providing trademark and trade dress protection, the primary threat to 
innovation currently is not to the major fashion conglomerates. As we explain, 
these luxury firms are already well protected by the existing trademark and 
trade dress legal regime, brand investments, and the relatively small overlap 
between markets for the original and for the copy. The main threat posed by 
copyists is to innovation by smaller, less established, independent designers 
who are less protected along all of these dimensions. Affording design 
protection would level the playing field with respect to protection from 
copyists and allow more such designers to enter, create, and be profitable. 
Relative to the current regime, we would expect the resulting distribution of 
innovation to feature increased differentiation and range of expression. It 
would also push fashion producers toward investment in design innovation and 
 
17. Venessa Lau, Can I Borrow That? When Designer “Inspiration” Jumps the Fence 
to Full-On Derivation, the Critics’ Claws Pop Out, W MAG., Feb. 2008, at 100 (providing 
examples of derivation among top designers). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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away from proliferation of brand logos by established firms making use of 
what legal protection is available.  
Fashion highlights a social dynamic to which intellectual property law 
inevitably attends: the relation between the individual and the collective in the 
production and consumption of creative work. The interplay of individuality 
and commonality with others poses a constant tension in innovation and its 
regulation. The distinction we emphasize—essentially between copying and 
remixing—runs through intellectual property.18 The idea that innovation—in 
the form of interpretation, adaptation, and remixing—is not harmed but 
benefited by legal protection against close copying suggests a need to attend to 
this often elided conceptual distinction in conducting the debate about how 
much intellectual property protection we want to have, not only in fashion, but 
elsewhere. 
This Article works between two modes of analysis: law and economics, 
and cultural theory. We use each set of lenses together.19 Law engages culture 
through a system of regulation and distribution. Economic analysis of law, for 
its part, endeavors to design legal regulation that induces optimal private 
choices, given a set of criteria about what is desirable.20 This instrumental 
project can benefit from a cultural account that identifies a set of features to be 
optimized. The ambition here is to generate insights that deepen understanding 
of both culture and economics while blurring their boundaries, to clarify the 
goals and consequences of legal regulation. Culture-oriented readers may 
perceive the cultural insights here to subsume economic ones, while at the 
same time, economically oriented readers may perceive the economic insights 
to subsume culture. This is a not altogether unintended result of an approach 
that we might call “cultural law and economics,” and on which we hope to 
elaborate in the future.21 Though our own fuller excursus on the approach is 
beyond the scope here, it is arguably both a new method of boundary-crossing 
 
18. See L AWRENCE  LESSIG,  REMIX:  MAKING  ART AND COMMERCE  THRIVE IN THE 
HYBRID ECONOMY (2008); cf. Jeannie Suk, Note, Originality, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1988, 1993 
(2002) (exploring literary rewritings, which “revise texts that are part of our shared cultural 
vocabulary,” and observing that “[w]hen certain texts have shaped our means of talking and 
thinking about important ideas, riffing on those texts in new literary works is a powerful way 
to refashion our language, worldview, and aesthetic”). 
19. By way of comparison, the field of cultural economics applies economics to “the 
production, distribution and consumption of all cultural goods and services.” RUTH TOWSE, 
Introduction  to A  HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL  ECONOMICS 1 (Ruth Towse ed., 2003); cf. 
BRUNO  S.  FREY,  ARTS AND ECONOMICS:  ANALYSIS AND CULTURAL  POLICY (2000); 1 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE (Victor A. Ginsburgh & David 
Throsby eds., 2006); JAMES HEILBRUN & CHARLES M. GRAY, THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND 
CULTURE (2001); RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CULTURAL ECONOMICS (Ruth Towse ed., 2007); 
DAVID THROSBY, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE (2001). 
20. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). 
21. Future work may offer a programmatic treatment. Cf.  Christine Jolls et al., A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). This Article is 
satisfied to develop the approach through application. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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that demands development, and one that nuanced scholars of law, culture, and 
economics have engaged all along.  
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins by discussing two major 
theories of fashion based on status and zeitgeist, which will become important 
to our ensuing analysis. It then offers the key distinction between copying and 
trends, which we argue is necessary for accurate understanding of fashion 
innovation. Finally, this Part briefly discusses the normative question whether 
fashion is a desirable site of innovation. Part II theorizes the culture of fashion 
as the simultaneous operation of two phenomena that we call “differentiation” 
and “flocking.” It models fashion consumption as the simultaneous adoption of 
a trend feature combined with differentiating features of a good, and explains 
how designers come to offer products that appeal to both differentiation and 
flocking at once. 
Part III explains the threat to innovation posed by a recent, important 
change in industry structure—namely, new “fast-fashion” manufacturers and 
retailers that engage in unregulated copying on a large scale. This Part shows 
how fast-fashion copyists both reduce innovation and affect its direction. In 
response, Part IV proposes a new intellectual property right that grows out of 
our analysis. The new right would protect original designs, but only from close 
copies. Our proposal takes an intermediate stand between permitting free 
copying of fashion designs and creating a broad right of exclusion. The 
Conclusion underscores the broad implications of the social dynamics of 
innovation explored here for the field of intellectual property generally. 
I. WHAT IS FASHION? 
Fashions change. Styles emerge, become fashionable, and are eventually 
replaced by new fashionable styles.22 What is obvious is that the demand for 
new fashions is not reducible simply to material or physical needs. Though one 
may need a replacement pair of jeans when an old pair gets holes from wear, or 
a warmer coat when the weather gets cold, for most people across the socio-
economic spectrum, the purchase of clothing is far from limited to these kinds 
of situations. Nearly all of us inevitably participate in fashion, even if we do 
not try to follow it.  
Fashion change is an elusive phenomenon, in need of cultural explanation. 
Thinkers in a range of fields have reflected on what fashion is, and in particular 
what accounts for fashion, the movement from introduction to adoption to 
decline of particular styles. We begin by discussing two principal theories of 
fashion that will become important in our ensuing analysis. 
 
22. See, e.g., George B. Sproles, Analyzing Fashion Life Cycles: Principles and 
Perspectives, 45 J. MARKETING 116, 116 (1981). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
1156  STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol.  61:1147 
                                                          
A. Status 
The most influential and widely held theory posits fashion as a site of 
struggle over social status. This is a view most concretely articulated in terms 
of social class at the turn of the century by Georg Simmel, the German 
sociologist, who was in turn influenced by Thorstein Veblen’s classic work, 
The Theory of the Leisure Class.23 
According to this view, fashion is adopted by social elites for the purpose 
of demarcating themselves as a group from the lower classes. The lower classes 
inevitably admire and emulate the upper classes. Thereupon, the upper classes 
flee in favor of a new fashion in a new attempt to set themselves apart 
collectively. This trickle-down process, moving from the highest to the lowest 
class, is characterized by the desire for group distinction on the part of the 
higher classes, and the attempt to efface external class markers through 
imitation on the part of the lower classes.24 Change in fashion is thus endlessly 
propelled by the drive to social stratification on the one hand and to social 
mobility on the other. 
When the magazine Vogue was founded in 1892, its first published pages 
presented the editorial goal as the representation of the lifestyle of New York 
high society, “the establishment of a dignified authentic journal of society, 
fashion and the ceremonial side of life.”25 According to a recent history of the 
magazine, at the turn of the century, the social context of Vogue’s origin was 
one in which the most privileged families of New York “felt invaded by 
parvenus who, with little lineage but plenty of money, attempted to join in its 
aristocratic activities.”26 From the beginning, Vogue’s representations of the 
fashions of the upper class were accompanied by those of the homes and 
parties of prominent families, as well as articles on social etiquette.27 
This feature has stayed constant throughout the last century, as Vogue has 
been the most visible and important U.S. publication devoted to fashion.28 The 
magazine exerts tremendous influence on consumers and the fashion 
industry,29 and  continues today to feature prominently the link between 
 
23. See VEBLEN, supra note 4; Simmel, supra note 4. 
24. See G RANT MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION 94 (Indiana Univ. Press 
1990) (1988) (characterizing fashion as an upward “chase and flight” pattern rather than a 
trickle-down process). 
25. Arthur B. Turnure, Statement, reprinted in VOGUE VOLUME I NOS. 1-28, at 16, 16 
(N.Y., The Fashion Co. 1893). 
26. NORBERTO ANGELETTI & ALBERTO OLIVA, IN VOGUE 2 (2006). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. See, e.g., Xazmin Garza, The Making of Style, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 13, 2008, 
at 13CC (citing “the fashion equivalent of the bible, Vogue magazine”); Karen Thomas, 
“Men’s Vogue” Goes for the Sophisticated Guy, USA  TODAY, Aug. 24, 2005, at 2D 
(describing Vogue as “a 100-year-old women’s fashion bible”); Emily Wax, For India’s 
“Brand Freaks,” Gucci Trumps Gandhi, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2008, at A10 (reporting 
launch of Indian edition of “Vogue magazine, the bible of high-end fashion”). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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fashion, high society, and wealth. It functions as an arbiter of taste and style, 
representing fashion trends and contributing to their creation. The images of the 
lifestyles presented are unabashedly those of elites—wealthy socialites, 
celebrities, and occasionally people associated with high culture. But these 
images are not intended only for the wealthy. The dominant reach of Vogue 
depends on circulation outside of the social elite and among the many other 
readers. It aims at aspiring middle-class consumers as well as affluent upper-
middle-class and upper-class women.30 
Though the social class account has been criticized as too simplistic and 
one-dimensional,31 the broad influence of status is still in abundant evidence 
today. Fashion trends reach many consumers via observation of the ways of the 
wealthy and other high-status people. Within that project of cultural 
dissemination there is self-conscious openness about the trickle-down aspect of 
fashion trends. Fashion magazines, for example, sometimes juxtapose images 
of new high-priced fashion items, unaffordable by a long stretch for most of the 
readership, with pictures of similar, lower-priced items and information about 
where to obtain them.32 The drive of the ordinary consumer to emulate those 
who can afford the most expensive fashion is assumed and indeed promoted in 
the popular discourse of fashion. 
B. Zeitgeist 
The other major theory of fashion sometimes goes by the term “collective 
selection,” associated with the sociologist Herbert Blumer.33 On this theory, 
fashion emerges from a collective process wherein many people, through their 
individual choices among many competing styles, come to form collective 
tastes that are expressed in fashion trends. The process of trend formation 
begins vaguely and then sharpens until a particular fashion is established.34 
The themes of the trend reflect the spirit of the times in which we are livin
 
30. See M EDIAMARK  RESEARCH  &  INTELLIGENCE  GROUP,  2008  SURVEY OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSUMER (2008). Vogue has a circulation of 1.2 million and a total audience of 
10.6 million people, and median household income of readers is $64,640. Id. Its mission 
statement describes the magazine as: 
America’s cultural barometer, putting fashion in the context of the larger world we live in—
how we dress, live, socialize; what we eat, listen to, watch; who leads and inspires us. . . . 
Vogue’s story is the story of . . . what’s worth knowing and seeing, of individuality and 
grace, and of the steady power of earned influence. 
Vogue Mission Statement, reprinted in Condé Nast Media Kit, 
http://condenastmediakit.com/vog (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). 
31. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 5; Blumer, supra note 6. 
32. See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1705-11 (describing the 
“Splurge vs. Steal” feature of Marie Claire magazine). 
33. Blumer, supra note 6; see also ORRIN E. KLAPP, COLLECTIVE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 
(1969);  LANG  &  LANG,  supra note 4; Dwight E. Robinson, Style Changes: Cyclical, 
Inexorable, and Foreseeable, 53 HARV. BUS. REV. 121 (1975). 
34. Blumer, supra note 6, at 282. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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This theory arises as a direct critique of the trickle-down theory. The driver 
of fashion is not necessarily imitation of high-status people per se. Rather, 
people follow fashion because they desire to be in fashion. That is, people want 
to associate themselves with things that are new, innovative, and state of the 
art. They want to keep pace with change. If a particular fashion starts in a 
certain group, then other people join, not simply out of desire to emulate that 
group, but because being in fashion is desirable.35 
As a means of signaling and communicating about oneself, and of 
perceiving messages about others,36 dress has a symbolic function and is even 
considered by some social theorists to be a code or a language that provides 
visual cues and signifiers of identity, personality, values, or other social 
meanings.37 Consumers choose among many possible options that are 
available in the market, and select the styles that they will wear, not merely 
based on their size and physical needs. They often think of their fashion 
choices as expressions of individuality and personal style. At the same time 
that the selections so operate at the individual level, they also aggregate into 
collective 38
Through the process of selection and aggregation of tastes, the fashion 
trend that emerges reflects the zeitgeist. This movement happens through 
individual choices, but it has a collective character that implicates society. For 
example, September 11 was widely thought to have affected fashion.39 A 
fashion for military looks may arise when the country is at war.40 Styles—not 
just sales—may refer to an economic downturn.41 A style sported by a 
particular public figure may capture the zeitgeist or inspire a trend.42  
 
35. Id. 
36. See Morris B. Holbrook & Glenn Dixon, Mapping the Market for Fashion: 
Complementarity in Consumer Preferences, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FASHION 109 (Michael 
R. Solomon ed., 1985); see also E RVING  GOFFMAN,  THE  PRESENTATION OF SELF IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE 24 (1959).  
37. See, e.g., BARTHES, supra note 5, at 59; CRANE, supra note 4. 
38. Blumer, supra note 6, at 282. 
39. See, e.g., Amy M. Spindler, Best of the Collections; Clothes of Quiet Inspiration, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at E37 (interpreting some designers’ collections after September 
11 as suggesting American iconography); Guy Trebay, Waiting for Takeoff: Designers Offer 
a Peek of Spring, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at B11 (“Many American designers, in the 
season shown after 9/11 . . . were moved to express . . . the anxiety that had crept into most 
corners of American life.”). 
40. See, e.g., Cathy Horyn, Macho America Storms Europe’s Runways, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 3, 2003, at A1 (detailing the prevalence of such Iraq War-inspired fashion as “an image 
that symbolized the virile Texas cowboy in boots and broad hat” and “battle jackets and 
cartridge belts fashioned from banker’s broadcloth” on the runways of Milan). 
41. See, e.g., David Colman, When Fashion Goes for Broke, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 
2008, at G6 (“‘Whenever the economy gets tough, fashion responds by playing it safe,’ said 
Jim Moore, the creative director of GQ . . . .”); Eric Wilson, Combating the Gloom? Child’s 
Play, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at E4 (interpreting a particular trend in 2008 as designers’ 
efforts to “cope with the consumer gloom in the only way they know—that is, by channeling 
the mind-set of their inner children. It may be just a coincidence, but children’s books and a HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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The symbolic function of fashion depends on the interplay of individual 
and social meanings. Fashion features the tension between the desire to be 
distinct as an individual and the desire to connect with a collectivity. Another 
way of saying this is that the fashion process imposes social constraints and 
parameters within which individual choices of communication and expression 
are shaped and directed. Fashion is then driven forward as a combination of 
individual differentiation and collective identification, and of the personal and 
the social impulses. 
Without necessarily denying the importance of status or imitation in the 
explanation of fashion trends, what we are calling the zeitgeist theory is in 
effect a critique of a status account in which fashion trends essentially consist 
of imitation of high-status people. The zeitgeist theory views trends as the 
collective aggregation of individual choices throughout society. These choices, 
which are both expressive and consumptive, converge on themes that reflect 
the milieu and social context of the times. 
C. Copies Versus Trends 
In each of these theories, consumers desire, and producers provide, articles 
that are on trend. Some observers assume that the trendy articles are copies: 
either the exact same article purchased from the same producer, or else a close 
copy of most elements of the original’s design. But such copies play only a 
limited role in the rise and fall of trends. Participation in a trend—by a 
consumer or a designer—does not necessarily or usually entail copying. 
First, one individual may seek to imitate another—as the status theory 
suggests—but without necessarily copying her dress. One can imitate another’s 
style by consciously or unconsciously being influenced to wear clothes in that 
style. Copying is a more literal and direct process in which one targets the 
original for replication. For example, a consumer can imitate the length of a 
 
color palette by Crayola have emerged as a pop cultural theme in art and fashion with 
surprising alacrity, as if in anticipation of a need for more simplistic comforts”); see also 
Suzy Menkes, Bulls, Bears and the Bellwether Hemline, N.Y.  TIMES, July 17, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/17/fashion/15jolie.html (published online) (discussing the 
history of fashion’s response to recession, focusing on plummeting hemlines). 
42. See, e.g., Teri Agins, Over-40 Finds a Muse: Designers for the Middle-Aged Pin 
Hopes on Mrs. Obama, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2008, at W4 (reporting on Michelle Obama’s 
influence on fashion and quoting a magazine editor describing her as “represent[ing] the 
post-feminist generation—a woman who can wear a sheath dress and show her arms—and 
women are responding to her ability to be feminine, sexy and still powerful.”); Ray A. 
Smith, Pulling Off the Obama Look, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2007, at P1 (“With the suit-and-
no-tie look gaining prominence lately—presidential hopeful Barack Obama has drawn 
attention for sporting a version of the approach, and Microsoft’s Steve Ballmer and Boeing 
CEO Jim McNerney have done it, too—more men are trying it out themselves.”); Eric 
Wilson, Merrily They Dress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at E1 (“Ever since the Obamas 
appeared on election night as a coordinated fashion tableau, as if they had just stepped out of 
a holiday greeting card portrait, sales of red dresses have been terrific, said Kay Unger, who 
makes party frocks.”). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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skirt without necessarily purchasing a copy of that skirt. Copying, in other 
words, is only a subset of a wide range of imitative practices. 
Second, consumers may join trends without an imitative motive. The 
zeitgeist theory emphasizes not imitation, but rather an individual’s distinct 
desire to be in fashion. People can want to be in fashion without necessarily 
having as their object the emulation of the lifestyle, values, or status associated 
with a particular group that first sported the style. They may instead—or also—
seek to join a collective moment. Such convergence does not require a copy of 
what others are wearing. 
  Third, designers may furnish on-trend articles without closely copying one 
another. Instead, they may engage in interpretation, or “referencing.”43 They 
may quote, comment upon, and refer to prior work.44 Unlike much close 
copying, such interpretation does not pass off the work as the work that is 
being copied. Instead, it marks awareness of the difference between the two 
works as it looks to the prior work as a source of influence, or even a precursor. 
Even where the influence is not completely conscious or direct, the latter work 
draws on the meaning of the earlier work, rather than being simply a copy of it. 
For example, the look of a Chanel knit jacket has been interpreted repeatedly in 
other designers’ styles, so that it has become a classic style drawing on the 
spirit of the look without purporting to be a Chanel product. Another Chanel 
classic, the quilted handbag, has been similarly reinterpreted. 
This practice, by which designers draw freely upon ideas, themes, and 
styles available in the general culture, and refer back to others’ prior designs, 
has led to the widespread but incorrect view that there is no real originality in 
fashion design.45 This view is no more correct than the analogous complaint 
about music: that homage and pastiche somehow deny any claim of originality 
to new works. The important point is that interpretations are different from 
copies in their goals and effects. Close copies can substitute for and reduce the 
value of the original, thereby reducing the incentive to create, to a greater 
extent. Rather than being substitutes, interpretations may even be complements 
for other on-trend articles.46 
A status theory of fashion might lend to the view that trend-joining is 
essentially copying. Accordingly, the fashion trend rises as a form of 
 
43. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1700 (“reference”); id. at 1728 
(“referencing”). 
44. For example, Proenza Schouler’s spring 2008 collection was widely understood to 
draw upon the previous work of Balenciaga designer Nicolas Ghesquiere. Lau, supra note 
17. There are many such examples every season. Id. 
45. See, e.g., Amy Kover, That Looks Familiar. Didn’t I Design It?, N.Y. TIMES, June 
19, 2005, § 3, at 34 (“Mr. Schwartz of A.B.S. has some advice for newcomers: Stop 
whining. ‘When you are talking about fashion, lose the word original,’ he said. ‘Ask the 
small designers where they got their inspiration. They pull their inspiration from others. It’s 
in the air. You don’t sit by the window and wait for it to materialize.’”). 
46. For further discussion of complementarity, see infra Part II.B. For further 
discussion of substitution, see infra Part III.B. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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emulation, and then declines when elites or early adopters feel the need to 
distinguish themselves from the copying masses and adopt a new style as a 
means to do so. If one thus equates trend-joining with copying, then one might 
reasonably conclude that fashion is driven by copying.47  
But it is important to see that status does not exhaust the motivations for 
fashion. Under a zeitgeist theory, fashion is not just imitation of elites or early 
adopters, and is not reducible to copying. Fashion choices are expressions of 
individuality that combine into collective tastes. Fashion reflects the desire for 
the new, for movement with the collectivity, for contact with the spirit of the 
times. This theory leads us to disaggregate fashion trends from copying, and 
see that fashion moves not necessarily as the result of a market’s saturation 
with copies. Copies may play a role in fashion change, but they are not the 
engine without which innovation in fashion would slow and stagnate.  
D. Why Promote Innovation in Fashion? 
Before further developing and applying these distinctions between copying 
and trends, we first pause with readers who may wonder whether fashion is 
worth promoting. After all, one might well agree with our account of the 
features of fashion, but consider fashion innovation to be undesirable. 
Everyone takes part in apparel fashion on some level. Everyone inevitably 
expresses themselves through the clothes they wear (even if to communicate 
that they are too serious to care about fashion). But some may consider fashion 
frivolous or wasteful. They may believe that we would be better off if fashion 
did not exist and if clothing were used only for the literal purpose of covering 
the body or keeping warm.  
  This set of intuitions lies behind the Anglo-American and European history 
of sumptuary laws, which, until the eighteenth century, purported to limit the 
expenditures people could make on clothing, to protect against the vice of 
wasteful spending for personal appearance and ostentatious display, including 
for purposes of following fashions.48 Moral disapproval of expenditure on 
fashion is traditional. Normative regulation of fashion goes back to the Greeks 
and the Bible.49 The moral stance found, albeit incompletely enforced, in many 
 
47. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11. 
48. See A LAN  HUNT,  GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING  PASSIONS:  A  HISTORY OF 
SUMPTUARY LAW (1996). 
49. Solon, the legendary lawgiver of ancient Athens, created some of the first 
sumptuary laws, regulating conspicuous consumption at funerals—including how many 
shawls a widow could wear. See Anne Theodore Briggs, Hung Out To Dry: Clothing Design 
Protection Pitfalls in United States Law, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 169, 204 (2002). 
Deuteronomy 22:5 says that “[t]he woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, 
neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment: for all that do so are abomination unto the 
Lord thy God.” 1 Corinthians 11 sets out guidelines about head covering while praying. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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religious traditions from Christianity to Buddhism, rejects luxury spending on 
garments and promotes plain garb.50 
Another reason for looking askance at fashion may be concern about 
visible markers of status hierarchy. Many historical sumptuary laws actually 
imposed hierarchical dress codes, granting privileges to wear certain garments 
to the upper class or prohibiting the lower class from wearing certain 
garments.51 Perhaps fashion is normatively undesirable because it is a way in 
which class and wealth disparities can easily be shown. Chairman Mao, in the 
pursuit of egalitarianism and Marxist rejection of surplus value, dictated that a 
billion people should wear an identical unadorned outfit, and for some decades 
they did so,52 notwithstanding China’s rich history of fashion and its 
contemporary unabashed re-embrace of consumer capitalism.53 
With respect to the morality of expenditures or the issue of wastefulness, 
for the purposes of this Article, we treat fashion consumption the same way we 
would ordinarily treat the consumption of other nonharmful goods that have 
creative and expressive components, such as books, music, films, and art. (To 
varying degrees, fashion is present in those areas as well. For example, there 
may be a trend of memoirs about addiction, films about Iraq, biographies of 
presidents, or novels about ancient biblical secrets.) It is difficult to see how the 
argument about wastefulness or immorality of spending on a coveted suit or 
dress would be different in kind from paying a sum for a work by a highly 
regarded painter. We assume that if consumers are prepared to pay for fashion 
in its various forms, regulation ought to be set to promote innovation and allow 
consumers a variety of options.54  
  Some readers may resist this set of assumptions in various ways. First, the 
idea that the measure of the value of fashion is akin to the measure of the value 
of books, music, and art may strike some as absurd.55 Even though fashion is 
not widely regarded as one of the “fine arts,” it is undeniably a creative good 
that has expressive features. It is no more logical to denigrate the value fashion 
choices confer upon consumers than to denigrate the value of the best-selling 
thriller many are reading or the hit song many are listening to. We may of 
 
50. Well-known examples include the highly regulated attire among the Puritans, the 
Amish, Catholic nuns, Buddhist monks, and Ultra-Orthodox Jews. 
51. See HUNT, supra note 48, at 172. 
52. See, e.g., PATRICIA BUCKLEY EBREY, THE CAMBRIDGE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF 
CHINA 294 (1996) (noting the Communist Party’s early efforts to rid Chinese cities “of what 
they saw as decadence—flashy clothes and provocative hairstyles”). 
53. For detailed discussion of China’s ancient and complex history with issues of 
intellectual property, see generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT 
OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995). 
54. This is a common assumption in economic models about fashion. Gene M. 
Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Foreign Counterfeiting of Status Goods, 103 Q.J. ECON. 79, 89 
(1988). 
55. This has been a strong intuition of some colleagues with whom we have discussed 
this project. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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course engage in value judgments about, say, the artistic value of Grisham 
relative to Proust, of pop music relative to Bach—and of fashion relative to 
literature and music. But that kind of hierarchical value distinction among 
cultural products is not to be confused with the notion of value on which we 
rely here. The choice to purchase these goods is, on our welfare account, 
evidence of value, and that is unrelated to the quality or merits of particular 
cultural products or genres of cultural production. Indeed it is the only evidence 
that can be measured, short of a separate normative assessment of whether 
people are wise to desire the things they do. Here we assume the desirability of 
investments in creative goods and in fashion as a creative good. 
Second, some may view fashion consumption as a product of social 
pressure (i.e., to look “cool” or at least not to look like a “dork”),56 and 
therefore unable to confer meaningful welfare gains on its consumers. 
Participation in fashion seems to be freely chosen by consumers. For the 
purposes of this Article, we assume that, especially when it comes to economic 
choices that are not necessary for human survival, adults’ decisions may be 
construed as voluntary and therefore as a desirable pursuit of their life plans.  
  Finally, there may be concerns about negative positional externalities of 
fashion. These concerns pertain to status signals generated by fashion as a 
means of displaying wealth or other markers of status. For example, if fashion 
serves to distinguish some from others,57 the satisfaction some people receive 
from signaling their high status through fashion may be offset by the disutility 
of others. On this view, participation in fashion trends is spending to reduce 
that disutility. This expenditure is wasteful. It would be better if nobody spent 
in this way. Accordingly, if fashion were eliminated (à la Mao, or school 
uniforms), social welfare would improve; increasing fashion innovation cannot 
be seen as a gain in welfare.  
  This is a plausible view of negative externalities that corresponds to a 
theory of fashion as driven by status. But if the centrality of such status seeking 
is displaced with what we have been calling the zeitgeist theory, the status 
signal is not the dominant aspect of fashion. As we have explained above, the 
desire to be “in fashion” involves more than signals about status. It is a means 
of individual expression through which people partake in collective movement 
and the spirit of the times. Fashion enables this expressive process, and as such 
has benefits much like those associated with other consumptive goods that are 
also expressive. Signals of status are undeniably present in all these goods (just 
think of the high-end art market, high-brow literary fiction, or opera 
performance), but so too—and more importantly—are means of expression. 
Our view that innovation in fashion is socially desirable rests on assumptions 
 
56. Cf., e.g., Vanessa O’Connell, Fashion Bullies Attack—In Middle School, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 25, 2007, at D1 (“Teen and adolescent girls have long used fashion as a social 
weapon.  .  .  . But today, guidance counselors and psychologists say, fashion bullying is 
reaching a new level of intensity as more designers launch collections targeted at kids.”). 
57. See supra Part I.A. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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that are shared with the assumption that in general the creation of new novels 
and new songs is socially desirable. 
II. A MODEL OF TREND ADOPTION AND PRODUCTION 
This Part reflects on fashion as a cultural phenomenon and identifies 
features of fashion that may be engaged by legal regulation. The aim is to 
distill the features we have discussed above under the rubric of the zeitgeist 
theory, which points us to two conditions that exist simultaneously and in 
relation to one another. We call them “differentiation” and “flocking.” 
A. Differentiation and Flocking 
Through fashion, people communicate and express themselves. 
Fashionable individuals’ personal style is often described as “unique” or 
“inimitable.”58 If consumers use fashion to express themselves as distinctive 
individuals, then it is valuable to have available a large range of different 
identifiers. Fashion goods provide a vocabulary. What consumers might value 
in fashion then is the availability of a variety of goods to choose from, a 
proliferation of the number of meanings that can be made. The availability of a 
variety of different goods enlarges the vocabulary and the meanings that can be 
communicated. 
If consumers have a taste for differentiation of identity through fashion, 
then individual differentiation becomes an identifiable desired feature, for the 
purpose of intellectual property regulation of fashion. We posit that 
“differentiation” is a key feature of the consumption and production of fashion. 
But fashion would not be fashion were it not for its basically collective 
character. Even as individuals strive to differentiate themselves through fashion 
choices, fashion is a means of participating in group movement. We call this 
“flocking.” 
Consumers tend to engage in flocking in buying new clothes, not because 
they need them, but because their existing clothes seem outdated. They want to 
be “in fashion.” Flocking among consumers is again not necessarily a function 
of imitation or copying of any particular groups or individuals, though it may 
be. It can be a manifestation of a desire to partake of the collective moment, to 
be in step with society, or to be in touch with the present. It may be pleasurable 
for people to move in a collective direction, joined by others in expressive 
 
58. See, e.g., Arienne Thompson & Erin O’Neill, Brotherly Style Sense, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 12, 2008, at B14 (“The Jonas Brothers may be burning up the music charts, but their 
unique sense of style is also getting them noticed in the fashion world.”); Bruce Weber, 
Diane Keaton Reflects on Keeping ’Em Laughing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2004, at E1 (“Her 
famously unique wardrobe (for the interview she wore a black business suit, jacket and skirt, 
over a pair of blue jeans) is the fashion equivalent of philosophical Berra one-liners.”). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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endeavor. There may be pleasure in a convergence, in participation in similar 
themes and ideas that reflect the times that all are experiencing. 
Fashion is simultaneously characterized by differentiation and flocking—
two phenomena that might appear to be in tension. On the one hand, the 
expressive and communicative aspects of fashion choices seem to benefit from 
a distribution of innovation that produces goods that are differentiated from 
each other. Thus we identify differentiation as a desired goal in fashion. On the 
other hand, we also notice benefits of moving in a common direction and 
partaking of the same trend. Thus we also identify flocking as desirable. The 
idea is well captured by Anna Wintour, editor of Vogue, who noted that what is 
laudable in fashionable people is at once “looking on-trend and beyond trend 
and totally themselves.”59 
Our theory then is that in fashion we observe the interaction of the tastes 
for differentiation and for flocking, or differentiation within flocking. The 
relation between differentiation and flocking is the key dynamic. People want 
to engage in flocking in a way that allows individual differentiation within it. 
They want to be part of a trend, but not be a replica of others who also join the 
trend. It would not be fashion if only flocking behavior were present. A world 
in which exactly one design of suit exists, due to demand or fiat, could be said 
to have apparel but not fashion. Nor would it be fashion if only individual 
differentiation were present. A world in which no collective patterns could be 
discerned could not be said to have fashion either. Fashion consists of both 
human desires, to flock and to differentiate, in relation to each other. 
It might be feasible to posit a more exact relationship between 
differentiation and flocking—for example, to specify a utility function that 
captures the relationship between the two preferences. One source of 
complexity is that tastes for differentiation and flocking will vary across 
consumers. One could in theory posit a person at one extreme who 
overwhelmingly values differentiation and thus avoids trendiness or any 
similarity to what others are doing. One could also posit a person at the other 
extreme who wishes to appear exactly the same as others. But the key point of 
the differentiation-flocking model is that the tastes of consumers are not at 
these particular extremes but rather express measures of both differentiation 
and flocking. The precise relationship between the two varies with the 
consumer, or even for the same consumer under different circumstances. For 
example, the same person might favor conservative suits (flocking) and 
extreme neckties (differentiation). The relationship between differentiation and 
flocking can also vary with the particular fashion trend or the particular item of 
fashion.60 Furthermore, a consumer’s utility from a particular configuration of 
differentiation and flocking may depend on how much differentiation versus 
flocking others are engaging in. Much complexity accompanies the attempt to 
 
59. Anna Wintour, Editor’s Letter, VOGUE, Aug. 2008, at 70. 
60. See, for example, our comparison of handbags and apparel in Part II.B. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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pin down the exact relationship. A key element of our theory is that the tastes 
for differentiation and flocking exist together in a dynamic relationship. 
  Finally, notice that the relation between flocking and differentiation maps 
on to the relation between copying and innovation. Just as direct reproduction 
of an existing novel is not innovation, if fashion were all about producing exact 
copies of existing articles, it would not be a practice of innovation. The impulse 
to flock in fashion is expressed in the aspects of fashion that draw on and 
sometimes copy existing works, but what makes the field a creative endeavor is 
the drive to differentiate—to reinterpret, change, remix, and transform, and as 
such, resist the sheer replication of existing works even while incorporating 
them. That is the creative impulse. In other words, differentiation constitutes 
innovation in fashion. Without the differentiation component, fashion would 
not be a form of innovation. Our favoring of differentiation in fashion then is 
an outgrowth of our assumption of the theory of incentives underlying 
intellectual property law about the effects of copying on creators’ incentives. 
B. Trend Adoption 
The process of trend adoption reflects differentiation and flocking. Think 
of a fashion item as having two kinds of attributes, a trend feature (around 
which consumers flock) and various differentiating features. The trend feature 
is some shared, recognizable design element such as a wrap dress, a fitted 
fringed jacket, a driving shoe, or a floral print.61 The differentiating features 
are all design elements other than the trend feature that make the items within 
the trend nevertheless different from each other. Consumers are able to identify 
a trend feature, factoring it out from the other features. Their recognition 
process may be simple—seeing many items with the trend feature in stores or 
on the street—or it may be enhanced by advertising or magazine articles that 
identify the trend f
Many consumers prefer new items that are part of a trend. A consumer 
does not care solely about the presence of a trend, however. In addition, the 
consumer has a taste for differentiation in the article’s other features, and 
preferences that vary according to body shape, aesthetics, or personal style. 
Fashion-conscious people generally do not seek to wear precisely the same 
outfit as someone else.62 Rather the consumer seeks goods that contain the 
trend feature but are differentiated. 
 
61. Bright florals were a trend for spring 2008. Hilary Alexander, Paris Round-up, 
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 8, 2007, at 20 (noting floral theme across many shows, with the 
specific implementation varying greatly). 
62. See, e.g., Amy Odell, Internet Saves Inaugural-Ball Attendees from Wearing the 
Same Dress, N.Y. MAG., Jan. 2, 2009 (describing a new website, DressRegistry.com, “that 
allows women to register the dresses they’re wearing to big events like the inaugural balls so 
they don’t end up wearing the same thing as someone else”). The social anxiety that attaches 
to this phenomenon has, for decades, been a recurring target of popular parody. See, e.g., I 
Love Lucy: Lucy and Ethel Buy the Same Dress (CBS television broadcast Oct. 19, 1953). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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How does a trend catch on? Suppose designers in one season produce, say, 
an unusually large number of designs with floral prints. Consumers recognize 
the floral print as the feature that is part of the potential trend, by seeing the 
prints in stores and on other consumers. The trend takes off, provided that 
enough consumers conclude two things—first, that enough other people are 
buying items with the trend feature that a trend will occur; second, that the 
consumer’s idiosyncratic preferences are well-enough served by a particular 
item that the consumer buys it. To take off, the trend must offer something 
sufficiently new. After all, new clothing is not an essential good in this context, 
and the new trend is competing with a closet full of existing clothes. Put 
differently, a new trend exhibits a network effect in consumption: individuals 
buy if enough others are buying or can be expected to buy—for example, 
because articles with the same trend feature appear in many shops at the same 
time. If multiple vendors offer the same new trend element at the same time, 
together with the differentiating details also necessary to satisfy consumer 
demand for differentiation, this is more likely to produce a successful new 
trend. 
Consumers, ever on the lookout for something new, identify a new trend 
feature, not much present in the previous season’s items, as a fresh basis for 
asserting commonality. The feature could be as simple as the introduction of a 
loose fit in jeans after a period when skinny jeans were everywhere. But among 
the looser jeans available there can be a nearly infinite variety of combinations 
of cut, color, fabric, texture, wash, and rise. 
Our flocking-differentiation model is distinct from some status models of 
trend adoption in which a fashion good is a repository of status, and individuals 
who purchase goods convey their status by displaying the item.63 A high-end 
“it” bag is the paradigmatic case. As a particular handbag obtains “it” status, 
for example, there might develop a long waitlist for the desired bags, which are 
sparingly doled out by stores, with priority given to customers of high status.64 
Even outside of the narrow band of “it” bags, high-end designer handbags often 
have status-conveying functions. When a high-end designer bag becomes 
trendy, many want precisely the same bag, making it a particularly good 
exemplar of the status model. 
If the status model applies best to a subset of designer handbags, the 
present flocking-differentiation model better captures consumers’ attitudes 
toward apparel, where consumers seek to be on trend but also have a taste for 
differentiation. Thus, arguments made in favor of permitting counterfeit bags, 
 
63. See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1718 (basing the “induced 
obsolescence” model on the proposition that “[c]lothing is a status-conferring good”). 
64. See, e.g., MICHAEL  TONELLO,  BRINGING  HOME THE BIRKIN:  MY  LIFE IN HOT 
PURSUIT OF THE WORLD’S MOST COVETED HANDBAG (2008) (describing one man’s effort to 
circumvent the legendary waiting list for a Birkin bag); cf.  Sex and the City: Coulda, 
Woulda, Shoulda (HBO television broadcast Aug. 5, 2001) (showcasing a New York 
fashionista’s desperate attempt to secure a Birkin bag of her own—and the comic 
humiliation that ensued). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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so as to thwart the ability of wealthy consumers to convey status through them, 
do not apply in precisely the same way to apparel. 
The foregoing suggests three preconditions for the success of a trend. First, 
the new trend feature must be sufficiently uncommon among previously 
available articles. Second, the new trend feature must be sufficiently prevalent. 
And third, there must be a sufficient differentiation of items that contain the 
trend feature so as to satisfy demand for differentiation and help to achieve a 
critical mass of consumers. 
C. Trend Production 
Designers, too, engage in a process of differentiation and flocking. In any 
given season, they flock to similar hemlines, dress shapes, and tailoring. They 
converge on similar or related styles and themes. Yet the precise result reached 
by each producer is different.65 
Flocking results, in part, from shared influences. If images of war fill the 
news, military-inspired styles may enter multiple collections.66 If a celebrity or 
a new film gains acclaim for a distinctive style, that style may be incorporated 
into the work of several different designers.67 Forecasting services furnish a 
common input to some designers, particularly the followers.68 Designers and 
other personnel move from fashion house to fashion house, making their 
imprint on multiple brands.69 Common pressures in the real world—women’s 
entry into the professional workplace in unprecedented numbers, for 
example—can lead to a “convergent evolution” of independently derived, 
parallel innovation.70 New technological possibilities, such as a novel fabric, 
can produce commonalities in collections as well.71 
 
65. This is shown in the “runway reports” offered by fashion magazines. See 
generally, e.g., Runway Report: Fall’s New Looks, HARPER’S BAZAAR, June 1, 2008, at 182 
(assembling trends from fall collection in a special edition of magazine). 
66. See, e.g., Horyn, supra note 40. 
67. See, e.g., Ruth La Ferla, Forget Gossip, Girl, the Buzz Is About the Clothes, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 8, 2008, at A1 (describing the “‘Gossip Girl’ influence” on designer collections). 
68. See, e.g., Vanessa O’Connell, How Fashion Makes Its Way from the Runway to the 
Rack, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2007, at D1 (describing use of such services by J.C. Penney and 
others). 
69. See, e.g., Lau, supra note 17 (collecting examples of designers and consultants 
whose moves—between Helmut Lang and Calvin Klein, Marni and Chloé, and Tom Ford 
and Burberry Prorsum—contributed to a shared style at each pair of firms). 
70. Convergent evolution is “the recurrent tendency of biological organization to 
arrive at the same ‘solution’ to a particular ‘need.’” SIMON  CONWAY  MORRIS, LIFE’S 
SOLUTION: INEVITABLE HUMANS IN A LONELY UNIVERSE, at xii (2003). 
71. See, e.g., Michele Loyer, Brave New World of “Techno” Fabric, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Oct. 11, 1996, at 24 (“Two years ago, fashion designers like Calvin Klein, Donna 
Karan and Giorgio Armani started using technical fabrics, until then restricted to industrial 
use (fire-proofing) or motorcycling, in their sportswear lines.”); Heesun Wee, Spandex 
Market Expected to Stretch, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Oct. 13, 1999, at B7 (describing 
incorporation of Lycra and similar materials, once limited to athletic attire, in street-wear HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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Flocking also results from mutual influences and inspiration among 
designers. They and their assistants attend fabric and other trade shows, where 
they learn from suppliers what other designers have planned—sometimes with 
the suppliers’ active encouragement.72 Stylists, magazine editors, and buyers 
travel from designer to designer, cross-pollinating as they move.73 The shows 
are not quite simultaneous, extending across several weeks and cities, and last-
minute tinkering can incorporate the influence of designers who have had 
earlier shows. 
These shared influences promote convergence around a trend, but not 
identical articles. For one thing, the shared influences are usually too general to 
produce identical articles. Moreover, each producer has substantial incentives 
to produce a differentiated product. A producer, faced with differentiated 
demand, will tend to seek out a differentiated niche to satisfy, rather than 
occupy the exact same space as another producer.74 Some producers are better 
suited for some niches than others—they may understand one segment of the 
market (teenagers, say, or Californians) better than another, and focus 
accordingly. Offering an on-trend, distinctive good may be a source of benefit 
to some producers, since it offers the opportunity to work with and be in 
communication with others on a similar problem.75 And choosing a 
differentiated product, rather than the exact same good offered by another 
producer, raises the probability that a trend supported by differentiation within 
flocking will get off the ground in the first place.76 
The differentiation-flocking model of production, like that of consumption, 
has limits. It may not apply to “it” handbags, for example. Where consumers 
are uninterested in differentiation—where they do not even have idiosyncratic 
physical needs (due to body shape or coloration), but simply want the status 
signaled by the item—the model may not apply. There may be apparel items 
 
collections). 
72. According to one insider, “fabric salesmen have only to whisper, ‘let me show you 
the fabrics that Saint Laurent is ordering,’ and the stampede is on.” Teri Agins, Copy Shops: 
Fashion Knockoffs Hit Stores Before Originals as Designers Seethe, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 
1994, at A1. As the same piece explains, “[p]erhaps fake fur [an important trend one season] 
was merely ‘in the air,’ as designers like to say when such coincidences occur. But most of 
them can sense which way the fashion winds are blowing by attending the big textile shows 
held each year in Paris and Milan.” Id.; see also Jonathan M. Barnett et al., The Fashion 
Lottery: Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic Markets 31-35 (USC Ctr. in Law, Econ. and 
Org., Working Paper No. C08-17, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1241005 
(emphasizing the importance of trade shows as a communication tool). 
73. Christina Binkley, Runway to Rack: Finding Looks That Will Sell, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 6, 2008, at D1 (noting that most sales come from pre-collections sold prior to the 
runway shows). 
74. See, e.g., Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929). 
75. Cf. Y OCHAI  BENKLER,  THE  WEALTH OF NETWORKS:  HOW  SOCIAL  PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 91-99 (2006) (discussing nonmonetary motivations 
for social production). 
76. For a different model that also predicts similar but differentiated products, see 
Barnett et al., supra note 72, at 31 (characterizing imitation as a form of insurance). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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that are like “it” handbags. But for most apparel, there are idiosyncratic 
preferences, and a taste for differentiation, that make the differentiation-
flocking model applicable. 
The economic imperative to both differentiate and flock resembles the 
innovative production of more technologically intensive goods. Similar limited 
cooperation takes place in the development of a new computer operating 
system or DVD player, in which producers jointly struggle to get a new 
“standard” or “platform” off the ground.77 There, too, it is a variety of 
differentiated products—“launch titles”—that contribute to the success of the 
shared feature by providing confidence about sufficient adoption that the 
platform will be a success. 
III. HOW UNREGULATED COPYING THREATENS INNOVATION 
Our model of trend production has two key features: a trend component 
that is shared by market players, and a second, differentiating component that 
varies for each designer. The model explains how producers collectively 
produce a trend: the common component fosters the sale of a diverse array of 
new, on-trend goods, which meet consumers’ simultaneous desire for on-trend 
and differentiated goods. 
A recent, important change in industry structure—“fast-fashion” 
manufacturers and retailers—threatens innovation in fashion. In this Part, we 
explain what is new about fast fashion and why it matters. We distinguish two 
types of fast-fashion firms, designers and copyists, and their disparate roles. 
Fast-fashion designers challenge but also enhance the fashion innovation 
process. Fast-fashion copying, by contrast, threatens the amount of innovation 
and pulls the direction of innovation toward fashion’s status conferral aspects 
and away from its expressive aspects. 
A. Fast-Fashion Copyists 
Copying in fashion is not a new problem. U.S. designers in the early 
twentieth century—and, before that, French couturiers—were plagued by 
competitors who made sketches at shows or measured the seams of procured 
originals to discern their patterns, and then used local labor to make the 
copies.78 Often, these copies could be accomplished quickly, and the copies 
reached the market before the original.79 
 
77. See Timothy F. Bresnahan & Shane Greenstein, Technological Competition and 
the Structure of the Computer Industry, 47 J. INDUS. ECON. 1 (1999). 
78. Sara B. Marcketti & Jean L. Parsons, Design Piracy and Self-Regulation: The 
Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, 1932-1941, 24 CLOTHING & TEXTILES RES. J. 214, 
215-17 (2006); Mary Lynn Stewart, Copying and Copyrighting Haute Couture: 
Democratizing Fashion, 1900-1930s, 28 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 103, 108-13 (2005). 
79. Stewart, supra note 78, at 108-09. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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What has changed is not the fact or speed of copying, but the large scale 
and low cost at which rapid copies can be made. (For comparison, just think of 
music, where rapid copying has long been feasible, while large-scale, low-cost 
rapid copying is a new phenomenon.) Today, a pattern can be based upon an 
Internet broadcast of the runway show and transmitted electronically to a low-
cost contract manufacturer overseas.80 A gradual easing in import quotas, 
begun in 1995,81 has increased scale and thereby lowered overseas 
manufacturing costs. Electronic communications and express shipping ensure 
that prototypes and finished articles can be brought to market quickly. As a 
result, thousands of inexpensive copies of a new design can be produced, from 
start to finish, in six weeks or less.82 
The most striking consequence of low-cost, high-scale, rapid copying is 
not in beating an original to market, but in the ability to wait and see which 
designs succeed, and copy only those. Copyists can choose a target after 
retailers have made their buying decisions, or even after the product reaches 
stores, and customers have begun to buy.83 Such copyists can reach market 
well before the relevant trend has ended.  
 
80. See, e.g., Kover, supra note 45 (“Large discounters like Target and H&M have 
signed major designers and can deliver fashionable clothing at cheap prices by 
manufacturing in countries like India and China and flying clothes to stores in the West. 
Computer systems can track inventories and replace sold-out items within a few days.”); 
Fashion TV, http://www.ftv.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (telecasting runway shows live); 
Fashion Week Daily Runway, http://www.fashionweekdaily.com/runway (last visited Jan. 
31, 2009) (providing photographs of collections); New York Magazine, Fashion, 
http://video.nymag.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (providing video of runway shows). 
81. The 1994 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, part of the Uruguay Round of 
world trade negotiations, dismantled quotas imposed by an earlier agreement, the Multifibre 
Arrangement of 1974. The Agreement removed some quotas immediately, and subjected the 
rest to a ten-year phaseout. World Trade Organization, A Summary of the Final Act of the 
Uruguay Round (“Agreement on Textiles and Clothing”), http://www.wto.org/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#cAgreement (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). The phaseout is 
limited by “safeguards” that permit importers to temporarily limit the increase in quotas. Id. 
82. One copyist, Forever 21, needs six weeks. Ruth La Ferla, Faster Fashion, Cheaper 
Chic, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2007, at G1 [hereinafter La Ferla, Faster Fashion]. Oscar knock-
off dresses take two to four weeks to reach consumers, as of 2006, compared to twice that 
time just five years before. Ruth La Ferla, Night of a Thousand Knockoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
9, 2006, at G11 [hereinafter La Ferla, Thousand Knockoffs]. 
Raustiala and Sprigman argue that little has changed—that for the past twenty-five 
years, copying has been “easy and fast,” and the increase in speed over that period “does not 
appear large.” See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1759-60. Elsewhere, however, 
they acknowledge a variety of factors that, in their view, increase copying speed, including 
“[d]igital photography, digital design platforms, the Internet, global outsourcing of 
manufacture, more flexible manufacturing technologies, and lower textile tariffs.” Id. at 
1714-15. In our view, the factors they identify are directed not only to speed—indeed, some 
(such as tariffs) likely have no effect on speed—but to greater scale, lower costs, and higher 
quality of rapid copying. 
83. Cf. Agins, supra note 72 (“The brisk market in ideas has even given rise to the 
‘knockoff consultant.’ . . . Carole Ledesma and Nathalie Jonqua . . . pose as ordinary 
shoppers while scouting boutiques in London, Paris and Milan. Each month, they mail 100 HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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Retailers and manufacturers exploit the resulting opportunity. They sell 
copies at a discount to the original—necessarily, given the lower quality84—
but earn a profit thanks to lower unit costs and the avoided expense of 
design.85 The most notorious copyist retailer is Forever 21,86 though copying 
also extends to a wide range of department stores and specialty clothing 
retailers.87 The retailers are supplied by manufacturers who, for the most part, 
remain anonymous. An exception is A.B.S., a prominent copyist of dresses 
worn to the Oscars awards ceremony and other red-carpet events.88 The 
Appendix contains two representative examples of close co
Copying is not a necessary element of the fast-fashion business model. 
Even retailers that sell copies do not sell only copies. And some fast-fashion 
firms eschew exact or close copies. For example, the two leading fast-fashion 
firms, Zara and H&M, avoid close copying.89 Although Zara and H&M may 
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84. Fast-fashion products, it is said, are made to be worn just ten times. Pankaj 
Ghemawat & José Luis Nueno, ZARA: Fast Fashion 13 (HBS Case Stud
 2006) (making this point about Zara, a fast-fashion designer). 
85. Cf. Design Piracy Act Could Hit China, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Oct. 29, 2007 
(suggesting that China would be affected by the proposed Design Piracy Prohibition Act 
because “fast-fashion companies . . . stand to lose
e on the shoulders of upstream designers”). 
86. Forever 21 makes frequent appearances at fashion websites that catalog copies. 
One such site, Fashionista, http://www.fashionista.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2009), lists 
Forever 21 copies of a Marc Jacobs shirt, a Marni handbag, and dresses by Foley & Corinna, 
Jonathan Saunders, and Phillip Lim. The extent of copying can be gleaned from trademark 
and copyright suits brought against the retailer. For examples, see Liza Casabona, Retailer 
Forever 21 Facing a Slew of Design Laws
the suits summarized infra Table 1. 
87. See, e.g., Eric Wilson, Before Models Can Turn Around, Knockoffs Fly, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2007, at A1 (describing one copyist’s sales to Macy’s and Bloomingdales, 
among others); Ben Winograd & Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan, Can Fashion Be Copyrighted?, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 11, 2006, at B1 (describing canceled wholesale orders for Ananas handbag, once 
copyists produced versions for “between 10% and 50% of her $285 price”). On specialty 
retailers, see, for example, Kover, supra note 45 (describing Abercrombie & Fitch copy of 
bag by designer Nicole Dreyfuss); Susan Scafidi, Karmic Relief, COUNTERFEIT CHIC, May 
10, 2007, http://www.counterfeitchic.com/2007/05/karmic_relief.php (last visited Feb. 18, 
2009) (describing Forth & Towne copy of Narcis
cribi g $130 Bebe copy of $1700 Versace dress). 
88. A.B.S., “[t]he uncontested champion of red-carpet knockoffs,” sells to leading 
department stores. La Ferla, Thousand Knockoffs,  supra note 82. By 2006, the Oscar-
knockoff bu
on. Id. 
89. Keith Naughton, H&M’s Material Girls: The Retailer Speeds Ahead with Fast 
Fashions, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, June 10, 2007, http://www.newsweek.com/id/33983 
(quoting H&M’s chief designer: “We don’t copy the catwalks. . . . We take 
t’s h ppening in the culture, with celebrities and on the catwalks.”). 
90. Lau, supra note 17 (“We’ve all heard the fashion knockoff tales. On one hand, 
there’s the down-market riffing on designer motifs that ranges from the H&HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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are different. Like the copyists, they move product to market very quickly.91 
But their on-trend product, reactive though it is to the latest offerings of top 
designers, is not a precise copy. Instead, it is an adaptation or interpretation, 
developed by in-house designers. 
The firms’ difference in design practice is reflected vividly in their relative 
frequency of suit. We searched Westlaw and the Stanford IP Litigation 
Clearinghouse for copyright or trademark suits against Forever 21, H&M, and 
Zara between 2003 and 2008. Forever 21 was a defendant in fifty-three suits 
during this period, compared to two for H&M and none for Zara.92 A review of 
the complaints in those cases shows that most of the Forever 21 suits alleged 
close copying, compared to at most one close copying complaint against 
H&M.93 As a research tool for scholars and other interested parties, we have 
collected the complaints, and those brought against several other alleged 
copyists, and made them available online.94 A selection of infringement suits 





ra note 84, at 9. Modifications or restocking of existing designs 
take
re retrieved directly from each district court’s electronic case filing system or 
clerk f
laint, Edwin Co. v. 
H&M
y, Harvard Law School, 
http:
most identical versions of her blouses and sweaters in such stores as 
H&M and Esprit.”). 
of th  world to counterfeit duds channeled through Chinatown dens.”). 
91. Zara takes four to five weeks to move from conception through delivery. 
Ghemawat & Nueno, sup
s just two weeks. Id. 
92. See Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse, http://lexmachina.stanford.edu (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2009), and Westlaw’s DOCK-FED-ALL file. The search terms included 
both H&M and Hennes and Mauritz, and both Zara and its corporate parent Inditex. 
Complaints we
’s o fice. 
93. See Complaint at 3-4, Tokidoki, LLC v. H & M Hennes & Mauritz LP, No. 07-cv-
1565 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007) (alleging infringement of plaintiff’s heart and crossbones 
trademark). The second suit arose from H&M’s collaboration with designer Elio Fiorucci. 
The “Fiorucci” trademark had been acquired by a third party, which sued H&M for allegedly 
using the Fiorucci name when it promoted the collaboration. See Comp
 Hennes & Mauritz LP, No. 05-cv-4435 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2005). 
94. See Berkman Center for Internet and Societ
//hub.law.harvard.edu/fashion (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). 
95. Additional evidence comes from websites such as Fashionista, 
http://www.fashionista.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2009), which contain frequent examples of 
close copying by Forever 21, but not H&M or Zara. Nor, in several dozen interviews on the 
subject with a wide range of industry stakeholders, did we hear any specific complaints of 
close copying by either firm. For an exceptional, though general, allegation of close copying 
by H&M, see Winograd & Tan, supra note 87, at B1 (“Designer Catherine Malandrino . . . 
says she has seen alHEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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Table 1. Selected U.S. Litigation Against Forever 21, 2007-200896 
 
Plaintiff Articles  at  Issue 
Anna Sui  Seventeen articles 
Anthropologie Ten  articles 
Bebe Stores  Twenty-eight articles 
Carole Hochman  Nightgown with “Marilyn Monrose” fabric design 
Diane von Furstenberg  Four wrap dresses and one blouse 
Harajuku Lovers  Clothing with “Heart and Heart/Box design” print 
Harkham Industries  Dress with “Shadow Fern” design 
Trovata Six  articles 
 
Fast-fashion copyists can have a beneficial effect upon trend adoption, 
since they reach customers at a lower price point who would otherwise not be 
reached by high-end designers.97 But this benefit can be even better supplied 
by fast-fashion designers, who not only offer the on-trend product at a lower 
price but also supply differentiating details. 
B. The Threat to Innovation 
Mass copyists undermine the market for the copied good. Copies reduce 
the profitability of originals, thus reducing the prospective incentive to develop 
new designs in the first place. The predicted result, a reduced amount of 
innovation, is familiar from copying in other creative industries, such as file 
sharing of copyrighted music and films. 
                                                           
96. The information in this table is drawn from First Amended Complaint at 7, Anna 
Sui Corp. v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 07-cv-3235 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2007); Complaint at 5-6, 
Anthropologie, Inc. v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 07-cv-7873 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2007); Amended 
Complaint at 3-13, Bebe Stores, Inc. v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 07-cv-35 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 
2007); Complaint at 3-4, Carole Hochman Design Group, Inc. v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 07-
cv-7699 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2007); First Amended Complaint at 5-7, Diane von Furstenberg 
Studio, LP v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 07-cv-2413 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2007); Complaint at 2-3, 
Harajuku Lovers, LLC v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 07-cv-3881 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2007); 
Complaint at 4-5, Harkham Industries, Inc. v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 08-cv-3308 (C.D. Cal. 
May 19, 2008); Complaint at 6-9, Trovata, Inc. v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 07-cv-1196 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 8, 2007). 
97. The designer can reach cost-conscious customers to some extent through bridge 
lines,  see Sally Weller, Fashion’s Influence on Garment Mass Production: Knowledge, 
Commodities and the Capture of Value 129-30 (Oct. 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Victoria University), available at http://wallaby.vu.edu.au/adt-VVUT/public/adt-
VVUT20050201.101459/index.html, albeit usually not close copies, but a fast-fashion copy 
is a still lower price. It is therefore no surprise that designers have issued small “capsule” 
collections through fast-fashion firms in many instances. See Eric Wilson, The Big Brand 
Theory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 74. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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Fashion copying is different from file sharing, however, in an important 
respect. File sharing provides access to essentially every musical work. Fashion 
copyists, by contrast, are selective. They have a business to run and costs to 
recoup, and so only the most profitable designs are copied. Moreover, not all 
copies reduce producer profits. Some are relatively harmless. 
The selectivity of copyists, combined with the uneven effects on producer 
profitability, reduce the incentives of some producers—and the incentive to 
produce some products—more than others. Thus, mass copying can be 
expected to affect the direction of innovation as well, as we explain below. 
1. Harmful copying 
Copyists target designs that are technically and legally easy to copy. 
Consider, for example, a floral-patterned dress introduced by designers Dana 
Foley and Anna Corinna (F&C).98 As a technical matter, the dress was easy to 
copy. It contained no exotic fabrics, complicated tailoring, or delicate 
embellishments that would make accurate outsourcing difficult.99 It lacked any 
exterior brand logo that would subject a copyist to trademark liability. Its shape 
and exterior details did not so powerfully call to mind F&C’s identity that trade 
dress protection would be available. These facts made the dress a good target 
for copyists.100 The Appendix contains photographs of the original and a copy 
by Forever 21. 
Moreover, for a midrange designer such as F&C, the sales of the copy 
substitute for and hence reduce sales of the original.101 The original dress sold 
for hundreds, not thousands of dollars, which is within the reach of copyists’ 
customers.102 Sometimes the substitution is made by an aggressive retailer, 
 
98. See La Ferla, Faster Fashion, supra note 82 (describing dress). 
99. Difficult-to-copy details are not an absolute bar because the copyist could omit or 
alter them. But such changes are costly and risky, since the copyist cannot tell, without 
incurring substantial cost, whether the detail is essential to the design’s appeal. Moreover, 
accuracy may be important to those consumers or retailers who know of the original and 
explicitly seek a close copy. 
100. La Ferla, Faster Fashion, supra note 82 (noting that the original and copy were 
“almost identical,” “[f]rom their fluid cut and noodle straps to the floral panel running down 
their fronts”). The floral print, assuming it satisfies copyright’s originality requirement, 
provides a possible basis for a legal claim against Forever 21. 
101. Kover, supra note 45 (describing accessory designer’s drop in monthly revenue 
from $50,000 to $10,000, following imitation); Eric Wilson, Simply Irresistible, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 21, 2008, § SPG, at 1 (noting return of F&C dress by customers who saw the copy); see 
also William Filene’s Sons Co. v. Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc., 90 F.2d 556, 558 
(1st Cir. 1937) (“A customer who . . . sees a copy . . . at another store at a lower price is 
quite likely to think that the retailer from whom she bought the dress lacks ability to select 
distinctive models and that she has been overcharged. Dresses are returned and customers 
are lost.”). 
102. Even customers of modest means might “trade up.” For a discussion of this 
phenomenon, see MICHAEL  J.  SILVERSTEIN ET AL.,  TRADING  UP:  THE  NEW  AMERICAN 
LUXURY 23-25 (2003). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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rather than the final consumer.103 Either way, the profits of the original 
designer can be much reduced. 
The extent of targeting, combined with the degree of substitution, explain 
why midrange designers account for most anecdotal complaints of design 
copying.104 They also bring most of the lawsuits that attempt to circumvent the 
lack of design protection by alleging copyright or trade dress violations under 
existing law, against Forever 21 and other fast-fashion copyists.105 
In addition to replacing sales, the prevalence of cheaper copies also may 
reduce demand for the original design. This “snob” effect106 may reflect a 
consumer’s desire for distinction from lower-status consumers or from other 
consumers more generally. It is a negative externality of overuse with analogies 
in trademark and copyright.107 The effect is amplified, moreover, when the 
same shopper visits different stores—or different floors of the same department 
store—selling a particular design in its original and copied forms.108 
2. Distorting innovation 
The reduced profits can be expected to have a negative effect on the 
amount of innovation; this is a standard result of economic theory. But in 
addition, there is a second effect. The lack of protection against design 
copying, combined with the existence of trademark, trade dress, and other 
protections, also distorts the direction of innovation. Designers unprotected 
against design copying see a disproportionate effect on their profitability, and 
hence are discouraged from innovating—indeed, from entering in the first 
place. Designers who are protected by trademark and trade dress innovate in 
ways that play to these legal advantages. The resulting effect on the direction of 
innovation is to favor innovation by designers who already enjoy existing 
 
103. See, e.g., Winograd & Tan, supra note 87 (describing cancelled wholesale orders 
for Ananas bag); Felix Salmon, Market Movers: Susan Scafidi on Copyrighting Fashion, 
PORTFOLIO, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2007/09/ 
19/susan-scafidi-on-copyrighting-fashion (listing examples in which initial or subsequent 
orders went to a copyist rather than the original designer). 
104. See, e.g., Kover, supra note 45 (describing designer’s experience of learning that 
a nearly identical version of her necklace was selling for much less at a local accessories 
distributor); La Ferla, Faster Fashion, supra note 82 (describing F&C designer’s discovery 
of a Forever 21 copy of her dress alongside the original on a fashion blog); Winograd & Tan, 
supra note 87 (describing canceled retail orders for Ananas bag after other companies 
provided similar, cheaper designs). 
105. The pattern of suits is an imperfect proxy, because they are design piracy cases 
undertaken as copyright or trademark suits, the only available tools. The data do not account 
for instances of copying where the originator did not or could not sue. The suits tend to 
highlight that copying which is costliest for originators—copying costly enough to induce a 
suit with uncertain prospects. 
106. See Leibenstein, supra note 3, at 189. 
107. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable 
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 485-86 (2003). 
108. See supra note 101. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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protection by other aspects of intellectual property law, over innovation by 
designers—particularly small, new designers—who are not thus protected.109 
The existence of some kinds of intellectual property protection combined with 
the absence of design protection also gives designers the incentive to create 
some kinds of products over others. 
Consider, for example, trade dress, which protects features of product 
design that serve as a source identifier, such as the distinctive hardware of a 
Coach handbag.110 In two cases, the Supreme Court considered whether trade 
dress protection requires a showing that consumers have come to identify the 
feature with its maker, so-called “secondary meaning,” or instead can rely upon 
the inherent distinctiveness of the feature. In the first case, outside the context 
of fashion designs, the Court ruled that secondary meaning was not necessary, 
in part because it recognized that such a requirement would place “particular 
burdens on the startup of small companies,”111 because established firms are 
better positioned to imbue their products with secondary meaning. However, it 
later ruled that secondary meaning is required for trade dress in apparel and 
other product designs.112 The result is to favor those incumbents with the 
resources to invest in the creation of secondary meaning.113 
Trademark reinforces the incumbency bias in a powerful way. Brand logos 
provide strong protection against copying by legitimate producers. Designers 
understand the value of logos as an anticopying device.114 Trademark 
protection accompanied by a lack of design protection thereby favors those 
firms that have strong trademarks and disproportionately encourages 
production of trademark-protected goods, such as articles with logos.115 After 
all, if Gucci can prohibit copies of designs that employ its trademark 
interlocked “G’s,” but not a similar work that lacks the logos, it has an 
incentive to employ the logo. It also encourages the production of types of 
items, such as handbags, for which logos (and trade dress) are highly 
 
109. As Karl Lagerfeld put it, copying “can be very damaging for small firms, though 
for a house like Chanel, it means a lot less.” Godfrey Deeny, Lauren Fined by Paris Court, 
and So Is Berge, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, May 19, 1994, at 1. 
110. Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co., 67 F. App’x. 626, 627 (2d Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam). 
111. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992); see also id. at 
774 (rejecting a secondary meaning requirement out of concern for its “anticompetitive 
effects”). 
112. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215-16 (2000). The 
Samara Brothers Court did not address its earlier Two Pesos dicta. 
113. See, e.g., Complaint, Louis Vuitton v. Limited Brands, No. 05-cv-3980 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 13, 2005) (asserting trade dress in a new line of bags); Scafidi, supra note 10, at 121. 
114. See, e.g., RENATA  MOLHO, BEING  ARMANI:  A  BIOGRAPHY 92 (2007) (quoting 
Giorgio Armani, who had been skeptical about monograms as an exterior decorative 
element, but acceded to an eagle logo for Emporio Armani to deter copiers, “even if it did 
not constitute a foolproof deterrent”). 
115. Scafidi, supra note 10, at 121-22; cf. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 
1723 (acknowledging that trademark may be deployed to limit design copying). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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complementary. Such “logoification” affects the communicative vocabulary 
that fashion provides, pulling fashion toward a status-conferring function and 
away from the communication of diverse messages.116 
Incumbents that produce luxury goods have several further advantages. 
Many high-end articles are hard to copy with low-cost outsourcing117 because 
they use expensive and distinctive materials and finishes.118 Investments in 
brand image provide an additional source of protection, and hence a further 
source of innovation distortion. A luxury image and retail buying experience 
insulate some high-end products from harmful copying. Brand image cements 
customer loyalty, a pampering in-store experience is pleasurable, and some 
customers value the authenticity of purchasing an original.119 These effects 
reduce substitution when copying occurs.120 They may also discourage 
copying, as they leave a copyist uncertain whether an item’s appeal comes 
from its design, or instead from the inimitable purchase experience. Large 
incumbents are better able to apply that investment across high volumes and a 
wide variety of items.121 The F&Cs of the design world—less-established 
designers who are not large incumbents—are again at a disadvantage.122 
 
116. Copyright introduces a secondary distortion. Copyright protects distinctive fabric 
patterns and physically separable ornaments, thus encouraging a designer to favor patterns 
over solids or investments to develop a new design. 
117. Bespoke copying, with high-cost manufacture and close fidelity, is still feasible. 
118. See, e.g., Binkley, supra note 73 (noting designers’ increasing use of embroidery 
and other embellishments as a way to maintain a differentiated product); Reena Jana, Put a 
Patent on That Pleat, BUS. WK., Mar. 31, 2008, at 65 (describing Stuart Weitzman’s use of 
titanium-reinforced heels, which are hard to copy because the heels will snap if copied using 
a cheaper material); see also Anna Van Praagh et al., One of These Bags Cost £23,000, The 
Other’s a Snip at £114, MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), Mar. 11, 2007, at 68 (describing the 
£23,484 Louis Vuitton Tribute Patchwork bag, made from fifteen different Louis Vuitton 
bags, partly to deter counterfeiters). 
119. Some consumers’ valuation of a bag’s authenticity may not be affected negatively 
by the existence of copies. Even if the copies look so good as to fool even a Louis Vuitton 
salesperson, and many will not know whether the bag is a copy, the purchaser of the Louis 
Vuitton handbag may take pleasure in knowledge of its authenticity. This is similar to a 
preference for an authentic piece of antique furniture over an identical-looking, well-made 
modern reproduction—the inner valuation of authenticity. Some classics of fashion might 
rise to take on this elusive aura in the face of existing knockoffs, but most items of fashion 
do not. 
120. Consider, for example, a much-admired Christian Dior dress worn by actress 
Charlize Theron to the Oscars ceremony a few years ago. Copyist A.B.S. made a copy that 
was sold in department stores to promgoers. Oscar Dress Knock-Offs and More, CBS NEWS, 
Mar. 2, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/02/earlyshow/living/beauty/ 
main677562.shtml (comparing original, “estimated to cost between $15,000 to $20,000,” 
with A.B.S. copy selling for $200 to $300). There is no substitution here. No buyer of the 
copy could afford the original, and buyers of the original avoided the copy, given its lesser 
quality and price signal. 
121. For some large incumbents, such as Christian Dior, the ready-to-wear collection 
is an advertisement that keeps the brand in the public eye, thereby permitting sales of 
profitable handbags and perfume whose sales depend upon brand image. For such firms, a 
decline in appropriability might push designers toward provocative but unwearable designs. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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A common normative response against the idea of intellectual property 
protection for fashion design grows out of the assumption that fashion is a 
visible marker of status. On this theory, making it more difficult to copy 
fashion may seem undesirable because it would promote the ability of wealthy 
people to enjoy and signal their status through apparel that only they can have, 
and thwart those who want to purchase cheaper knockoffs of those goods. After 
all, if rampant copying makes available cheaper knockoffs, that may disrupt the 
ability of the wealthy to distinguish themselves as a group through the signal of 
fashion. On this view, perhaps permission to copy effectively softens the 
socially stratifying effects of fashion, while legal restrictions on copying would 
reinforce them. 
But there is much more to fashion than signals about status. In light of the 
broader and more varied communicative and expressive aspects of fashion, 
status is only one of a wide variety of signals that fashion makes possible. 
Fashion has the potential to afford a broad vocabulary for the expression of a 
vast range of possible messages. Conscious or not, people’s fashion choices 
signify and communicate, with meaningful individual and collective valences. 
We have identified this dynamic between differentiation and flocking as the 
key to the experience of fashion in social life. People use fashion to signal 
individual differences while also partaking in common movement with the 
collectivity. This model has informed our analysis of the formation and 
function of fashion trends among producers and consumers. 
The current intellectual property regime, in which legal protection from 
design copying is lacking, tends, if anything, to push fashion consumption and 
production in the direction of status and luxury rather than more polyvalent 
innovation. In sum, we have noted two distortions. The first is toward the 
creation of designs that are legally more difficult to copy. Trademark and trade 
dress already protect the most salient status-signaling items in fashion, those 
adorned with logos of high-end brands. Therefore, those who want to enable 
effective status signal-jamming should be critical of trademark protection, and 
not necessarily resist copyright protection for fashion design. The second 
distortion is toward the creation of goods that are naturally (as opposed to 
legally) more difficult to copy, or goods that are more difficult for design 
copying to harm—for example, goods involving unusual or expensive materials 
or difficult workmanship. 
 
For an example, see Cathy Horyn, Offstage, Paris Fusses About Dior, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2000, § 9, at 1 (describing a Dior show by designer John Galliano that was “[d]rawn from a 
nether world of tramps and mental patients, . . . which had models draped eccentrically in 
newsprint-patterned silk and straitjackets”). A similar opportunity is unavailable to small, 
independent designers. 
122. “Perhaps because Ms. Foley and Ms. Corinna have been content to remain just 
under the radar, companies that specialize in making cheap copies of designer fashion have 
been bold in appropriating their designs.” Wilson, supra note 101. 
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The result of these distortions is to push creators toward the high-end realm 
of status and luxury, and away from devoting creative resources to design 
innovation. In a regime that protected original designs from copying, we would 
expect to see a shift in resources from developing brand-name or luxury goods 
or attempting close copies of designs toward developing a richer, more 
polycentric language of fashion that draws on and reinvents available 
inspirations and influences. We would expect to see greater range and variety 
in fashion innovation that would enlarge the vocabulary and the set of symbols 
with which we may produce meaning. 
At bottom, though, the main reason not to accommodate the lovers of 
cheap fashion knockoffs is more basic. It is the same reason that we do not 
have a legal regime that permits people freely to make and sell photocopies of 
another author’s book and retain the profits. It is the theory of incentives. 
Obviously, people always want to purchase inexpensive copies of creative 
works or have them for free. The reason to disallow it is not to deprive them of 
that benefit but rather to provide creators with an incentive to create. That is no 
less true in fashion.  
C. Is Piracy Really Beneficial? 
The analysis so far shows that copyists reduce the amount of innovation 
and distort its direction. In an influential article, Kal Raustiala and Chris 
Sprigman (RS) have advanced the counterintuitive argument that in the fashion 
industry, “piracy paradoxically benefits designers.”123 Some observers have 
found their argument persuasive.124 Here we explain why we disagree with 
their argument. 
RS start from the premise that derivation, inspiration, and borrowing are 
valuable and central to fashion and innovation. This general point is one that 
we too emphasize. But this does not make fashion relevantly different from 
music and film, where the same processes are important engines of 
innovation.125 In order to conclude, as they do, that “[w]hat works to protect 
the creative process in film and music will have the opposite effect on the 
runway,”126 more is needed. 
 
123. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1722 (“[P]iracy paradoxically benefits 
designers by inducing more rapid turnover and additional sales.”); see also id. at 1727 (“Our 
core claim is that piracy is paradoxically beneficial for the fashion industry, or at least piracy 
is not very harmful.”). 
124. E.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1105 (2008); Surowiecki, supra note 12; Hal R. Varian, Why That Hoodie 
Your Son Wears Isn’t Trademarked, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2007, at C3; Patti Waldmeir, Why 
Knock-Offs Are Good for Fashion, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, at 12. 
125. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS 
IN A CONNECTED WORLD 8-9 (2001). 
126. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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RS argue that the proliferation of copies of a style reduces the value of the 
style and renders it obsolete, which, in turn, causes consumers and hence 
producers to move on to new designs and trends.127 At first, producer profits 
are high. Then the copyists come in, and snob effects reduce the value of the 
good in the hands of existing users and would-be new users. New sales grind to 
a halt, and existing users become dissatisfied with the goods that they have. 
That, in turn, provides a new opportunity to sell new goods.128 RS call this 
“induced obsolescence.”129 Because the opportunity to sell new goods is 
profitable, and entails additional innovation, RS argue that copying benefits 
designers and innovation. Hence the “piracy paradox.” In light of this benefit, 
RS conclude it is a bad idea to protect designers from piracy.130 This type of 
argument has long played a role in debates over design protection.131 
RS’s analysis does not distinguish close copies from other relationships 
between fashion designs, such as interpretation, adaptation, homage, or 
remixing. In arguing that “growth and creativity in the fashion industry depend 
upon copying,”132 the “piracy” part of the “piracy paradox” is seemingly meant 
to include both close copies and the full range of remixing and trend-joining 
activities.133 
RS treat close copying and shared trends as indistinguishable for their 
purposes, referring to both phenomena as “copies.”134 We have explained 
 
127. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1722 (“[T]he absence of protection . . . 
speeds diffusion and induces more rapid obsolescence.”). 
128. Id. at 1721-22. 
129. The practical importance of “induced obsolescence” is uncertain because 
obsolescence has causes other than copying, including the passage of the seasons, a change 
in the spirit of the times that made the item salient, desire for the new, and the innovative 
product of other designers. These effects may be more important sources of obsolescence of 
fashion designs than the proliferation of copies. Even with respect to the example of induced 
obsolescence that RS provide, see id. at 1720-21 (“widely copied” Ugg boots), the 
explanation that copying by others destroyed the trend does not seem more likely than 
alternative explanations. 
130. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12 (“[G]rowth and creativity in the fashion 
industry depend upon copying.”). 
131. One close observer of the fashion industry in the 1930s, rehearsing the contrary 
positions in the debate, summarized the argument thusly: “On the other hand, it is pointed 
out that imitation means the rapid obsolescence of design which stimulates invention, 
assures to the designer a market, and brings to the industry accelerated business all along the 
line.” Helen Everett Meiklejohn, Dresses—The Impact of Fashion on a Business, in PRICE 
AND PRICE POLICIES 299, 338-39 (Walton Hamilton ed., 1938). 
132. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12. 
133. See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1715 (concluding, after a 
discussion of variations on a driving shoe, that “[f]rom the perspective of the music or 
motion picture industries, this is called ‘piracy’”). 
134. See, e.g.,  id. at 1700 (treating “slavish copies” and “loose copies” in a like 
manner); id. at 1724 (similar); Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12 (“When [designers] see 
something that they like, they copy it—or, in the argot of the industry, they ‘reference’ it.”). 
The term “copy,” “copying,” or its variants, has a variety of usages in technical copyright 
settings. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “copies” as “material objects, other than HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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above that it is important to disaggregate the phenomenon of close copying 
from the phenomenon of trends.135 Doing so helps make visible the effects on 
innovation of close copying as distinct from the effects of interpretation, 
inspiration, or homage.136 As we have also explained, there are also important 
differences among fast-fashion firms—differences between fellow designers 
such as Zara and H&M and copyists such as Forever 21—and their contrasting 
effects upon innovation.137 To be complete, an analysis must attend to the 
distinctive effect of close copyists. To consider an analogy, the argument that a 
broad remixing right for music benefits subsequent innovators tells us little 
about whether to prohibit exact copies.138  
RS’s “induced obsolescence” account emphasizes the increased 
profitability of faster cycles of new fashion trends spurred by unchecked 
copying. The assumption of profitability calls to mind Dr. Seuss’s famous fable 
of the Sneetches.139 There, the seller offered a new fashion article—stars to 
adorn the chest of each Sneetch. When too many Sneetches bought the stars, 
 
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed . . . and from which the work can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated”); id. (“The term ‘copies’ includes the material 
object . . . in which the work is first fixed.”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (using “copying” in two distinct senses, neither corresponding to the 
statutory definition of “copies”). As the Supreme Court explained in Feist, “Not all copying, 
however, is copyright infringement. To establish infringement, two elements must be 
proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the 
work that are original.” Id. In the quoted passage, the first use of “copying” pertains to 
factual copying. One can engage in such “copying” without any actionable similarity. The 
second use of “copying” in Feist pertains to actionable copying. Notably, it is “constituent 
elements” that are subject to “copying” in this second sense, rather than the work itself. 
135. See supra Part I.C. 
136. RS do acknowledge that “copying may cause harm to particular originators,” 
Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1727, but here, too, they mean “copying” to denote 
interpretation and other forms of reworking. They argue that this harm is unimportant, 
because a designer is “shrouded within a Rawlsian veil of ignorance,” id., and does not know 
in advance whether she will be a net borrower or lender of new material. That uncertainty 
does not plausibly extend to close copies, where the designers targeted for such copying are 
not also engaged in copying. See also Posting of Randy Picker to The University of Chicago 
Law School Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/11/ 
understanding_t.html (Nov. 14, 2006, 10:56 EST) (suggesting that a firm knows whether it 
is mainly a target, rather than a perpetrator, of “vertical copying”). 
137. Compare supra Part III.A, with Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 
2033 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10 (2006) (testimony of Prof. Christopher Sprigman), 
2006 WL 2127110 (F.D.C.H.) (“[S]ome of the biggest copyists are European: H&M, Zara 
and Topshop, these retailers, and European fashion firms that copy and that reinterpret and 
that recontextualize and that create derivative works and do all the things that fashion firms 
do.”), and Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1737 (singling out H&M and Zara as 
“two of the major fashion copyists”), and id. at 1759 (similar). 
138. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 18, at 144 (“I fight for ‘free culture.’ My position is 
weakened by kids who think all culture should be free.”). Lessig supports narrow copyright 
protection where “creativity would be hindered by the absence of this special privilege.” Id. 
at 85. 
139. DR. SEUSS, THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES (Random House 1961) (1953). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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devaluing them, the seller provided a new service: star removal. These cycles 
continued, with the seller profiting from each cycle, until the Sneetches ran out 
of money. 
This account, focused upon copies as the spur to the new, neglects the ex 
ante effect of the fashion cycle. What made star conferral and removal so 
profitable was that each Sneetch failed to recognize just how short-lived his 
fashion success would be, and to plan accordingly. Sneetches are not lifecycle 
pricers, in other words. But many fashion buyers are. If copying increases, and 
hence the fashion lifespan of the item falls, a consumer will recognize that fact 
and lower her willingness to pay. In the limiting case, producers’ revenue is 
unchanged, as consumers make unchanged periodic payments for fashion, and 
profits fall due to higher (because more frequently incurred) design, materials, 
and other costs of production. Close copies make matters worse, reducing 
designer profits in the meantime by reducing sales.140 
The adverse effects of copying explain why many designers oppose 
copying, just as they oppose counterfeiting of handbags. (RS’s piracy paradox 
argument, if correct, ought to apply to fashion trademarks and copyrights as 
well.) RS pitch their paradox as an explanation for the otherwise puzzling 
equanimity with which designers greet copyists.141 But that premise is faulty. 
In fact, many designers are vocal advocates against copying,142 and, as Table 1 
suggests, make use of the currently limited legal tools available to curb 
copyists.143 
 
140. This is not to say that life-cycle pricing will always undo a determined effort to 
profit from a deliberately short product lifespan. There is a substantial literature on “planned 
obsolescence” that shows how such efforts can succeed. See, e.g., Jeremy Bulow, An 
Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence, 101 Q.J.  ECON. 729 (1986). Under some 
conditions, these models predict deliberately low durability; under others, producers choose 
high durability in order to discourage other firms from entering the market. The induced 
obsolescence account does not lay out why the conditions for optimal low durability are met 
here, and if they are, why producers do not take advantage of other instruments for 
decreasing durability, such as product design. 
141. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1755-58 (contending that designers 
have great political power, and therefore the absence of design protection suggests that 
designers don’t really want it); cf.  Posting of Chris Sprigman to Public Knowledge, 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/1653 (Feb. 20, 2008, 18:41 EST) (describing 
proposed bill as “the CFDA’s little vanity project”). 
142. See supra note 9 (referring to collected quotations from designers and fashion 
executives). To be sure, on occasion, “[d]esigners admit to a certain pride that they are being 
copied. But their corporate backers are not so relaxed: piracy means an inferior product that 
too many may mistake for the real thing.” Business Sense, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2004, at 6 
(survey). That sense of validation—and the desire to be provocative—explain why, while 
Marc Jacobs the firm opposes copying, Marc Jacobs the designer (and Louis Vuitton 
creative director) declares not only design piracy but even counterfeiting to be “fantastic.” 
DANA THOMAS, DELUXE: HOW LUXURY LOST ITS LUSTER 276 (2007). 
143. See also Barnett et al., supra note 72, at 29 (compiling infringement suits 
reported by Women’s Wear Daily). Further evidence comes from European practice, where 
designers use the relatively strong protection available there to curb close copies. See infra 
notes 173-85 and accompanying text. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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Vigorous designer opposition to copyists is not new. Designers cared so 
much in the 1930s that they set up an enormous, costly, and successful private 
system of self-help, the Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, which 
boycotted retailers that did business with copyists, until it was enjoined as a 
violation of antitrust law.144 Their decades-long lobbying effort for stronger 
protection has been unsuccessful, not because designers are not harmed, but 
because they are not sufficiently powerful.145 
The induced obsolescence account has a further evidentiary limitation. If 
designers did profit from “induced obsolescence” of their products, they could 
induce the obsolescence themselves by taking a lax approach to counterfeits, or 
by engineering products designed to fall apart quickly.146 That they do not do 
so where it is currently feasible suggests that inducing obsolescence is not what 
fashion designers are engaged in. Even with protection, designers interested in 
an induced-obsolescence strategy could implement it by disclaiming protection 
against copying, or by burning out the trend more profitably on their own, 
without any help from copyists.147 Moreover, since, as we have explained, 
fashion trends do not depend on copying, designers would not need to induce 
obsolescence through copies in order to ensure the robust trends that comprise 
fashion. 
IV. TAILORED PROTECTION FOR ORIGINAL DESIGNS 
The analysis up to this point explains how the increased ease of copying 
disrupts innovation. It reduces the amount and shifts the direction. That, in turn, 
undermines the formation of differentiated communicative tools. Our proposed 
policy response aims to preserve differentiated innovation. Our distinctive goal 
is to prohibit close copies while preserving flocking and differentiation in its 
varied forms of inspiration, homage, referencing, and quotation. The guiding 
principle throughout is to avoid the hypertrophy or thicket of rights that is 
threatened by excessive, multiple rightsholders.148 
The proposal that thus grows out of our analysis is a narrow new right that 
protects designers against close copies of their designs but does not protect 
against looser forms of similarity that may arise as designers commonly 
 
144. See Marcketti & Parsons, supra note 78, at 226. 
145. In particular, many manufacturers and retailers, including department stores, 
benefit from copying. 
146. For a discussion of such strategies, see Barak Y. Orbach, The Durapolist Puzzle: 
Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods Markets, 21 YALE. J. ON REG. 67, 91-92 (2004). 
147. RS suggest that designers’ bridge lines accomplish this, see Raustiala & 
Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1724-25, but their example, Armani, seems inapt at least as 
applied to close copying, since Armani’s five lines—Giorgio Armani, Armani Collezioni, 
Armani Jeans, Emporio Armani, and Armani Exchange—each echo the Armani style, but do 
not offer the same design at a lower price point. Self-protectiveness about brand image may 
limit the extent of self-cannibalization. See Barnett, supra note 10, at 1406-07. 
148. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY (2008). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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participate in fashion trends. In recommending tailored protection for the 
fashion industry, we join other scholars who have urged industry-specific 
solutions to the regulation of innovation.149 
Part IV.A describes the scope of the proposed new right. Part IV.B 
considers some objections to our proposal. 
A. The Scope of the Right 
The proposed right has two components. First, it provides copyright 
protection to original works of apparel, even though these useful articles are 
currently not copyrightable. Second, it denies copyright protection where the 
later work, though arguably “substantially similar”—the usual standard for 
copyright liability—is also substantially different. 
The Copyright Act accords protection to “useful articles”—articles, such as 
apparel, that have “an intrinsic utilitarian function”150—only to the extent that 
protected features “can be identified separately from, and are capable of 
existing independently of,” the utilitarian aspects.151 This latter statutory 
requirement goes by the name of “separability.” The exclusion of apparel 
results from a particular interpretation of separability for works that have both a 
functional and an expressive component, such as an item of apparel or an 
architectural work. 
Separability can take a physical or conceptual form. Physical separability 
is present when the article, minus the protectable element, suffers no loss of 
utility, and the separated element can stand alone as a work of art.152 Physical 
separability suffices to protect an appliqué sewn onto a sweater, but not the cut, 
color, and appearance of an article of apparel. 
 
149. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. 
L.  REV. 1575 (2003) (advocating industry-specific judicial interpretation of patent 
doctrines); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006) (offering an industry-specific 
approach to antitrust law); William Fisher, The Disaggregation of Intellectual Property, 
HARV.  L.  BULL., Summer 2004 (offering a cautious endorsement of industry-specific 
intellectual property rules). 
150. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining a “useful article” as “an article having an 
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to 
convey information”). 
151. Id. For a historical account of this state of affairs, see 1 WILLIAM  F. PATRY, 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 269-70 (1994). 
152. 1 PAUL G OLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3 (3d ed. 2005 & 2008 
Supp.). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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Most courts also recognize the possibility of conceptual separability.153 
Defining its boundaries is a notoriously difficult task, and courts and 
commentators have reached a wide range of views as to the proper breadth of 
the doctrine.154 An expansive understanding of conceptual separability would 
be one way to provide protection for many designs, without the need for 
statutory change. That is, courts could potentially deem design aspects of a 
garment to be conceptually separable from a garment’s usefulness, and hence 
protected by current copyright law. The difficulty, however, is that, as with 
creative works of architecture, for example, design features often are treated as 
inseparable from a work’s function. 
The statutory alternative, and a more complete solution, is to take original 
fashion designs outside the domain of the separability regime, by adding them 
as a new and distinct type of copyrightable subject matter. This is a familiar 
part of copyright policymaking. In 1990, Congress took that step with respect 
to architectural works.155 We suggest that fashion designs receive copyright 
 
153. Compare Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (en banc) (recognizing conceptual separability), and Kieselstein-Cord v. 
Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (same), with Esquire, Inc. v. 
Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (limiting separability to physical separability). 
See also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B][3] 
(2008) (concluding that conceptual separability is a valid approach because the legislative 
history of the 1976 Act relies approvingly upon an earlier case, Mazer v. Stein, that found 
conceptual separability but not physical separability). 
154. The Seventh Circuit recently collected six possible tests in Pivot Point: [1] where 
the article’s artistic features are “primary” and the utilitarian features are “subsidiary” 
(following Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d 989); [2] where the article “stimulate[s] in the mind 
of the beholder a concept that is separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian 
function,” see Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(Newman, J., dissenting); [3] where the article “would still be marketable to some significant 
segment of the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities,” see Galiano v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2005); [4] where “the artistic design was not 
significantly influenced by functional considerations”; [5] where “the feature[] can stand 
alone as a work of art traditionally conceived,” and the article “in which it is embodied 
would be equally useful without it”; and [6] where “the artistic features are not utilitarian.” 
Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 923. The Seventh Circuit then devised its own test, requiring that 
separability exists when the article’s artistic aspects can be “conceptualized as existing 
independently of their utilitarian function,” a finding informed by “whether the design 
elements can be identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised 
independently of functional influences.” Id. at 931; see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 153, § 2.08[B][3] (canvassing this “fractured field”). 
155. See Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 703, 
104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (1990) (adding “architectural works” to subject matter of copyright); 
id. § 702(a), 104 Stat. at 5133 (adding “architectural work” to the definitions in 17 U.S.C. § 
101); id. § 704(a), 104 Stat. at 5133 (placing limits on the copyright in an architectural work, 
including denial of protection for certain pictorial representations); Donald Frederick Evans 
& Assocs., Inc. v. Cont’l Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 901 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986); 1 NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 153, § 2.20 (“United States copyright law prior to [1990] did not accord 
protection to structures, except those few that served no utilitarian purpose.”). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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protection that runs parallel to that now granted to buildings and architectural 
plans.156 
What counts as infringement is a second crucial question. To begin, 
standard features of a design—a pinstripe, say, or an A-line silhouette—are not 
copyrightable features. Their appearance in a latter work would not give rise to 
an infringement claim. This is a familiar element of copyright law.157 Beyond 
that, copyright law provides that, as to protectable elements of the work, 
“substantial similarity” between the two works amounts to infringement. This 
rule applies not only to standard copyrighted works such as books, art, film, 
and music, but also to newly added subject matter such as architectural 
works.158 Substantial similarity varies with the circumstances. Where 
copyright subsists in a compilation of unprotectable parts, the copyright is 
sometimes said to be “thin,” and protects the originator only against relatively 
close copies.159 One proposed bill to protect original fashion designs applies a 
substantial similarity st 160
Our analysis of copying and trends recommends a different and narrower 
rule. We would prohibit only close copies, in order to support differentiation 
amidst flocking. If a designer copies protectable expression from an earlier 
work, yet also makes significant changes, the designer is no longer liable. To 
the extent a thin compilation copyright does not narrow substantial similarity to 
 
156. The architectural amendment was made, in part, to comply with the Berne 
Convention.  See 1 NIMMER  &  NIMMER,  supra note 153, § 2.20. Arguably, the change 
proposed here is necessary to comply with TRIPS requirements as to industrial design. The 
TRIPS component of the Uruguay Round Agreement requires members to “provide for the 
protection of independently created industrial designs that are new or original.” Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 25, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 1197, 1207 (1994). United States design patents provide protection for industrial 
designs that are “new,” but the TRIPS agreement’s use of “or” suggests that designs that are 
original, but not new, must also receive protection. See Jerome H. Reichman, Universal 
Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the 
WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L  LAW. 345, 376 (1995). Extension of copyright would afford 
protection to originality even without novelty. 
157. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (2006). 
158. Id. § 101 (including definition for “architectural works,” and extending “pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works” to include architectural plans); id. § 102 (including 
“architectural works” in the coverage of copyright). 
159. See, e.g., 4 NIMMER  &  NIMMER  supra note 153, § 13.03 (noting that where 
protection is thin, the degree of required similarity required to satisfy “substantial similarity” 
increases); Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., No. 07-12596, 2008 WL 
5274274 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2008) (concluding, in light of thinness of copyright in a floor 
plan, that differences in protectable expression were significant enough to justify conclusion 
that works were not substantially similar). 
160. See, e.g., Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. §§ 2(a), (d) 
(2007) (adding fashion designs to types of design protected without altering “substantial 
similarity” infringement standard). But see Design Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th 
Cong. § 2(d) (2007) (altering applicable infringement standard to embrace only designs 
which are “closely and substantially similar in overall visual appearance to a protected 
design”). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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protection against only close copies, our proposal departs from the adage 
offered by Judge Learned Hand that “it is enough that substantial parts were 
lifted; no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he 
did not pirate.”161 Under our proposed rule, showing a substantial difference 
does indeed excuse the wrong.162 
This is not a radical step, either. In 1984, an analogous right was enacted as 
to another copyright misfit, namely the designs of semiconductor chips, and in 
particular the stencil-like “mask works” used in chip production. Protection 
extends to reproduction, importation and distribution of the mask work in 
question, and to a product embodying it.163 Substantially similar products are 
not subject to the prohibition. There is no broad control over the path of future 
innovation. We propose a similar standard here. 
The difference has important consequences. A designer is free to join a 
trend once it has begun, adopting the trend feature but altering the details to 
satisfy particular demand for differentiation. The test we propose would ask 
whether an ordinary observer could discern the copy from the original.164 This 
would be a test of “substantial dissimilarity.” If the two works were 
substantially dissimilar, no infringement would be found. 
Like other intellectual property standards that require subjective 
comparison of two works, our substantial dissimilarity test can raise difficult 
line-drawing problems. Consider, for example, Yves Saint Laurent’s famous 
suit against Ralph Lauren, brought under French copyright law, alleging 
infringement of a black tuxedo dress designed by Saint Laurent.165 Although 
the two articles differed in fabric (silk rather than wool), pockets (YSL’s had 
none), lapel width, and the substitution of black buttons for gold, the court 
 
161. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936). 
162. Nor do we propose any right to control the preparation of derivative works. That 
right “substantially overlaps the scope of the reproduction right,” 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
152, § 7.3.1, though the degree of overlap is open to dispute. The ordinary case of a 
protected article that “borrows expressive elements from the original, but adds expressive 
elements of its own,” would arguably implicate the reproduction right, rather than the 
derivative works right. Id. We do not mean to enter that debate. The point here is that we 
intend a right narrower than the usual copyright. 
163. 17 U.S.C. § 905 (2006). 
164. Tim Gunn, former chair of fashion design at Parsons who later gained fame on 
the television show Project Runway, says “I draw a line at something that, if you squint your 
eyes, you really can’t discern it from the original.” Serena French, Knock It Off!—Fashion 
Fights Back at Year of the Copycat; Counterfeit Counterattack, N.Y. POST, May 1, 2007, at 
41. 
165. Société Yves Saint Laurent Couture S.A. v. Société Louis Dreyfus Retail Mgmt. 
S.A., [1994] E.C.C. 512, 514 (Trib. Comm. (Paris)). Yves Saint Laurent’s version sold for 
$15,000, Ralph Lauren’s for $1000. Yves Saint Laurent sued after seeing the Ralph Lauren 
dress in a French fashion magazine. The dress was shown as part of a larger editorial spread 
featuring women’s fashion inspired by the tuxedo (in French, le smoking), see Femmes en 
smoking, JOURS DE FRANCE, Dec. 7, 1992, at 138-43—a nice example of differentiation 
amidst flocking. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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imposed liability.166 The Appendix contains photographs of both dresses. On 
our standard, the substantial differences would suffice to avoid liability, but we 
concede that the question is a close one. That said, these problems seem no 
more severe than those in ordinary copyright, trademark, or patent infringement 
cases. 
Why not go further and grant a broader right? Why not provide protection 
for “the cut of a dress or the sleeve of a blouse”167—and in essence, grant a 
single firm control over the exploitation of a trend? This possibility, sometimes 
described by intellectual property scholars as the granting of a “prospect,” 
raises some familiar problems that are likely to be particularly acute in the 
fashion context. Here, as in many areas of creative endeavor, good ideas are 
dispersed.168 Ideas for differentiated products that participate in the trend are 
scattered among many designers, and a single firm that controls the trend is less 
likely to get it off the ground. Identifying and negotiating with those designers 
who would use the feature is likely to be very costly. Moreover, many products 
would likely infringe multiple features, compounding the negotiation problem. 
At the same time, the granting of a broad right would provide no valuable 
incentive to upstream development. Unlike, say, a blockbuster movie or basic 
technology that forms the basis for downstream products, a trend feature is not 
the result of a single creator’s deep thinking or heavy investment. Rather, trend 
features arise in the collective way we described in Part II. Legal control is not 
needed to elicit these ideas, and a legal entitlement would likely create difficult 
disputes over ownership, given the often simultaneous or near-simultaneous 
processes by which multiple designers flock to a particular idea. 
What should be the appropriate duration of protection? Ordinary copyright 
lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years.169 Recent fashion proposals 
considered by Congress provide for three years of protection.170 In our view, 
this is plenty of time. Most fashion articles have only a brief opportunity to 
recoup the cost of design in any event. A short lifespan has the additional virtue 
of limiting the set of articles that a new design might possibly infringe. 
 
166. Deeny,  supra note 109; Michele Ingrassia, A Not-So-Little Black Dress, 
NEWSWEEK, June 6, 1994, at 72. The judgment was $383,000. Agins, supra note 72. The 
presiding judge added that the Saint Laurent dress, “I must say[,] is more beautiful—though, 
of course, that will not influence my decision.” Deeny, supra note 109, at 11. 
167. Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 
44 (1994). 
168. See, e.g., SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 38 (2004); C. Scott 
Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation, 25 YALE J. 
ON REG. 135, 174 (2008). 
169. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). The term is ninety-five years for anonymous works, 
pseudonymous works, and works made for hire. Id. § 302(c). 
170. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. § 2(c) (2007); Design 
Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. § 2(c) (2007). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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Some proposals incorporate fashion within an expansion of Chapter 13 of 
the Copyright Act, which was set up as a catchall for other design rights.171 
Should we take this opportunity to add other design rights such as furniture? 
That analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. We have not considered 
whether furniture or other design-intensive industries, which also lack 
protection, have a similar equilibrium of flocking and differentiation to 
preserve. Much seems different, including the role of trends, and the extent to 
which a trend feature coexists with differentiation. Seasonality is absent; fast 
fashion, too. The dynamics of furniture and other design-intensive industries 
await future research. 
B. Considering Objections 
This Subpart evaluates challenges to our argument that narrow copyright 
protection reduces copying, that reduced copying leads to more innovation, and 
that increased innovation is desirable. 
First, will new protection in the United States have any effect upon 
copying, given existing protection in Europe (among other jurisdictions172)? 
The European design right protects the features and overall appearance of an 
article.173 Although there is a registration system, the strong protection granted 
to unregistered designs makes registration unnecessary.174 Individual states 
 
171. Chapter 13 of the Copyright Act has the grand title “Protection of Original 
Designs,” and protects, in seemingly general terms, “useful articles.” 17 U.S.C. § 1301(a) 
(2006). But “useful articles” is defined therein as a “vessel hull, including a plug or mold.” 
Id. § 1301(b)(2). The proposed Design Piracy Protection Act expands “useful articles” to 
include apparel, handbags, belts, and eyeglass frames. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 
2033, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007). 
172. Although we focus upon European protection, it is notable that other jurisdictions 
also protect original designs. For example, Japan’s industrial design right protects the “form, 
pattern, or color of an object or a combination of these, which appeals visually to the 
viewer’s sense of aesthetics.” Japan External Trade Organization, Investing in Japan § 5.7.1, 
http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/setting_up/laws/section5/page7.html (last visited Feb. 18, 
2009). In addition, unfair competition law applies to original designs. Id. § 5.7.2; see also 
Interview with Shigekazu Yamada, Nat’l Ctr. for Indus. Prop. Info. & Training, Japan Patent 
Office, in Tokyo, Japan (May 21, 2008) (describing seizure of counterfeit Hermes purses for 
violating unfair competition law). 
173. Council Regulation 6/2002, art. 3, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1, 4 (EC) (protecting 
“appearance of the whole or a part of a product resulting from the features of, in particular, 
the lines, contours, colours, shape, texture and/or materials of the product itself and/or its 
ornamentation”). 
174. Unregistered designs are protected from copying for three years. Id., art. 19 (L 3) 
7 (scope of protection); id., art. 11 (L 3) 5 (duration of protection). Registration extends the 
duration to twenty-five years, if renewed every five years, id., art. 12 (L 3) 5, and adds a 
protection against independent invention. Id., art. 19 (L 3) 7. Designers enjoy a one-year 
grace period after the design’s public debut before registration is necessary. Id., art. 7(2) (L 
3) 5; see also Hedrick, supra note 13, at 251; OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL 
MARKET,  FREQUENTLY  ASKED  QUESTIONS  ABOUT THE COMMUNITY  DESIGN:  GENERAL 
QUESTIONS,  http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/RCD/FAQ/RCD1.ed.do (last visited Jan. HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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provide additional protection.175 Cease-and-desist letters do much of the work 
of enforcement,176 but litigation is significant too. Table 2 summarizes a few 
recent cases. 
Table 2. Selected European Litigation, 2005-2008 
Case Articles  at  Issue 
Hennes & Mauritz AB v. 
Primark Stores 
“[A] Chinese-style dragon and flame 
pattern, a target-style design, a graffiti 
pattern, a . . . badge design and a floral 
print”177 
Monsoon v. Primark Stores  Two  skirts, swimwear, trousers, a scarf, 
and patterned socks178 
Chloé v. Kookaï  Handbag179 
J. Choo Ltd. v. Towerstone Ltd.  Handbag180 
Chanel v. Camille & Lucie  Jewelry181 
                                                                                                                                       
31, 2009). 
175. For example, French law includes fashion explicitly in copyrightable subject 
matter. CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ  INTELLECTUELLE art. L112-2 (1994), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/cpialtext.htm (including, among the 
“works of the mind” covered by copyright law, “creations of the seasonal industries of dress 
and articles of fashion,” that is, “industries which, by reason of the demands of fashion, 
frequently renew the form of their products,” and naming a long list of articles, fabrics, and 
other products). 
176. Susan Scafidi, No, No, Naf Naf, COUNTERFEIT  CHIC, July 21, 2008, 
http://www.counterfeitchic.com/2008/07/no_no_naf_naf.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) 
(asserting that European companies “regularly settle” rather than litigate); see also 
Telephone Interview with Nathalie Moullé-Berteaux, Intellectual Prop. Dir., LVMH Fashion 
Group (Nov. 21, 2008) (noting firm’s vigorous cease-and-desist practice against infringers); 
cf. Video: Stop Fashion Piracy, http://www.stopfashionpiracy.com/theindustryspeaks.php 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (quoting Robert Triefus, EVP Communications, Armani, that 
European protections have a substantial effect). 
177. Jim Armitage, H&M Seeks Redress from Primark over “Copycat” Designs Row, 
EVENING STANDARD (London), Mar. 8, 2005, at 35. H&M alleged damages of £100,000. Id. 
178.  Lucy Farndon, Monsoon Sees Red, DAILY MAIL (London), Apr. 19, 2005, at 68 
(noting that Monsoon claims £200,000 in damages); Laura Peek, Copycat or Coincidence? 
Stores Face Court Clash, TIMES (London), Apr. 19, 2005, at 5. This case, like the H&M case 
against Primark, later settled. Lauren Veevers & Danny Fortson, Primark Chic, 
INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY (London), Nov. 5, 2006, at 24. 
179. Hadley Freeman, Bag Snatchers: High Street Copies Taken to Court, GUARDIAN 
(London), July 23, 2005, at 10. The suit proceeded under both European and UK design 
protection. For an earlier case under the UK design right, see Lambretta Clothing Co. v. 
Teddy Smith Ltd., [2004] EWCA Civ. 886 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/886.html (track suit with same arrangement 
of colors). 
180. J. Choo Ltd. v. Towerstone Ltd., [2008] EWHC 346 (Eng.), available at 
http://oami.europa.eu/pdf/design/cdcourts/Handbags.pdf. Jimmy Choo has brought multiple 
suits asserting European design protection. See, e.g., New Look Withdraws 1,000 Shoes to 
Settle Copying Case, TIMES (London), Sept. 13, 2006, at 56 (noting that “the designer had 
used relatively new European legislation”). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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Case Articles  at  Issue 
Isabel Marant v. Naf Naf  Little black dress182 
Karen Millen Ltd. v. Dunnes 
Stores 
Two striped shirts and a knit top183 
 
European protection has a limited effect upon the U.S. market. Fast-
fashion firms based in Europe, such as Zara and H&M, are subject to design 
protection. We would therefore expect them to avoid close copying as to 
products sold in Europe. If these firms sell the same products in both Europe 
and the United States, then we should expect relatively few close copies in the 
United States as well. As discussed above, that is indeed what we observe.184 
By contrast, Forever 21 is based in the United States, and has no stores in 
Europe.185 For it and other U.S.-focused copyists, European protection has no 
effect upon the production of close copies. Meanwhile, for U.S. designers who 
lack a substantial non-U.S. business, the entire market is subject to copyists. 
Thus, existing European protection does relatively little to help many U.S. 
designers. 
Second, will our proposed protection really reduce copying? Louis Vuitton 
has the resources to sue, but do smaller firms? We think the answer is yes. 
Under existing law, small designers already file suit. In the Forever 21 suits 
summarized in Table 1, many are by small designers. We see no reason to 
doubt they would take advantage of expanded protection. In this respect, 
fashion is no different from other areas of copyright, patent, and trademark, in 
which small plaintiffs are able to invoke their rights,186 sometimes with the 
assistance of counsel retained on a contingency basis.187  
                                                                                                                                       
181. Katya Foreman & Emilie Marsh, Hermès, Dior Notch Counterfeit Wins, 
WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Apr. 9, 2008, at 2. Chanel was joined in this suit by Givenchy, Van 
Cleef & Arpels, Boucheron and Cartier; the total fine was 700,000 euros, or about $1.1 
million.  Id.  In a separate suit filed by Christian Dior Couture, a further 150,000-euro 
($230,000) fine was imposed. Id. 
182. In Brief: Penalty for Copying, WOMEN’S  WEAR  DAILY, July 18, 2008, at 2; 
Condamnation pour copie: Naf Naf ne trouve pas cela “Marant,” A GORAVOX, July 22, 
2008, http://www.agoravox.fr/article.php3?id_article=42446. Naf Naf had sold a 70-euro 
copy of a dress that retails for 250 euros. The court imposed damages of 75,000 euros. 
183. Karen Millen Ltd. v. Dunnes Stores, [2007] IEHC 449 (Ir.). 
184. Raustiala and Sprigman draw the opposite conclusion from a single global 
product: that it shows that Zara and H&M operate with impunity in Europe. Raustiala & 
Sprigman, supra note 11, at 1737. 
185. See Forever 21, Store Locator, http://www.forever21.com/store/storelocator.asp 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2009). In addition to Forever 21, the other copyists discussed supra, 
such as A.B.S. and unbranded manufacturers that sell to U.S. department stores, are focused 
upon the U.S. market. 
186. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (copyright); Big O Tire 
Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977) (trademark); 
Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 726 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (patent).  
187. This arrangement is common in patent cases. For an example in trademark and HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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The designer will sue only if she expects a positive return on her litigation 
investment. Again, the existence of suits under the current regime shows that 
sometimes the stakes are large enough. Even where copyist manufacturers are 
judgment-proof, copyist retailers, generally speaking, are not. To be sure, 
where damages are small or difficult to calculate, deterrence is weakened, as in 
other areas of intellectual property. Damages here can be augmented by 
statutory damages188 and awards of attorney’s fees.189  
One way to strengthen deterrence is to consider mechanisms by which 
designers might band together. Economies of scale in enforcement are familiar 
from musical collective rights organizations such as ASCAP, and from the 
original Fashion Originators’ Guild. Like these organizations, a modern-day 
Guild could monitor and thereby deter unlicensed use. The new Guild, backed 
by law rather than the threat of boycott, would provide a credible enforcement 
commitment in situations where individual designers found enforcement too 
expensive to be worthwhile.190  
A related objection is that a new right will be an effective weapon only in 
the hands of established designers, and will be used not against copyists, but 
against the very designers most in need of protection. This objection has 
greatest force as applied to broad design protection. It seems unlikely to pose 
much trouble for the narrow right against close copies that we propose here. 
Third, does reduced copying lead to more innovation? After all, it is 
sometimes argued, there is a lot of innovation already. As we have explained, 
that innovation is increasingly under threat, particularly innovation not already 
protected by trademark or investments in brand image. But there is a more 
basic point. The level of existing innovation, high or low, tells us little about 
the incremental effect of a policy change. The fact that music sales are large, 
despite illegal copying, hardly demonstrates that copying is good or even 
neutral for creators of new music. As we have explained, fashion is relevantly 
similar to other areas of creative production, and we expect designers to 
respond to economic incentives in the usual way. 
Strong real-world evidence that protection reduces copying, which in turn 
increases innovation, comes from our single national experiment with 
 
copyright, see JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2007). 
188. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) ($30,000 for copyright infringement, or 
$150,000 in the case of willful infringement). 
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006) (trademark); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006) (copyright); 
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (patent).  
190. In this respect, our Guild proposal resembles intellectual property enforcement 
insurance, which covers the insured’s litigation expenses in case of a dispute. For an 
example, see Intellectual Property Insurance Services Corporation, IP Abatement Insurance, 
http://www.ipisc.com/products/insurance-policies/abatement (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). 
Such insurance serves to commit a rightsholder to pursue a claim. For a formal explanation, 
see Gerard Llobet & Javier Suarez, Patent Litigation and the Role of Enforcement Insurance 
(Feb. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at  http://www.cemfi.es/~llobet/ 
PLpaper.pdf). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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protection for original designs. During the heyday of the Fashion Originators’ 
Guild, the Guild’s privately enforced protection reduced copying greatly.191 
Moreover, contemporaneous observers understood that the prohibition of 
piracy caused manufacturers to shift production from copying to original 
design.192 
A fourth type of objection views substantial existing innovation as an 
argument against protection, not because protection won’t increase innovation, 
but because it will. In particular, increased innovation might be thought 
undesirable if it leads to excessive product differentiation. This possibility—a 
kind of over-entry, in which additional entry incurs social costs but does little 
to better satisfy consumer wants—has long been contemplated by a large 
theoretical literature in economics.193 Despite this theoretical possibility, we 
see no reason to conclude that it is unusually severe in fashion compared to 
other areas of creative production. Absent such a reason, either fashion should 
enjoy the higher protection of other types of creative production, or these other 
areas should also be denied copyright protection out of fear of excessive 
differentiation.194 
 
191. See, e.g., Guild’s Work Good in Upper Brackets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1936, at 
17 (noting general agreement among observers that the Guild’s program cut piracy by 75 
percent for higher-end dresses, and by 40 to 50 percent for midrange dresses). 
192. See, e.g.,  Complete Text of Master’s Report That Upholds FOGA’s Style 
Protection as No Monopoly, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Nov. 10, 1936, at 8, 10, 39 (reprinting 
special master’s finding, in rejecting a private antitrust challenge to the Guild, that the Guild 
caused some copyists to shift to origination); Fashion Guild Policy Held Aid to Industry, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1936, at 34 (reporting testimony that the Guild had caused many former 
copyists to change policy without going out of business); see also Dress Trade Urged To 
Curb “Unethical,” N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1936, at 32 (similar); Dress War, TIME, Mar. 23, 
1936, at 72 (Guild caused manufacturers of high-end dresses to begin “to do their own 
designing, confident that style piracy had been effectively outlawed”; moreover, as retailers 
returned copied dresses in a lower price range, “a number of manufacturers of these dresses, 
hitherto generally committed to copying higher priced dresses for a good proportion of their 
styles, decided that it was time to originate,” and became Guild affiliates). For an earlier 
suggestion that the Guild offers a valuable natural experiment in evaluating design 
protection for fashion, see Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts, VA. L. REV. IN 
BRIEF (2007), http://virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2007/01/22/picker. 
193. For exemplary analyses, see EDWARD  H.  CHAMBERLIN, THE  THEORY OF 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933); Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic 
Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977); A. Michael 
Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 407 (1976); see also N. 
Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND J. 
ECON. 48 (1986) (making the excess entry point without relying upon product 
differentiation). 
194. For an argument along these lines, see Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial 
Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM.  &  MARY  L.  REV. 33, 35-45 (2004); 
Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 96-
97 (2001) (noting “over-harvesting” and “distraction” costs from production of close 
substitutes); see also Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 212, 260-64 (2004). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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  A final critique of fashion to revisit is that, assuming fashion is a status-
seeking quest, then actions that further its spread might also raise its cost, by 
leaving an individual to choose between the disutility of falling behind and the 
social waste that accompanies catching up.195 This concern about the status 
function of fashion actually supports our proposal. The primary markers of 
status—trademark and brand image—will exist with or without design 
protection. Our proposal gives protection to designs that may lack a strong 
status component, thereby facilitating the shift of fashion away from the status 
function and toward the diverse innovation we value in other creative 
industries. 
CONCLUSION 
The amount and kind of innovation in fashion is directly connected to its 
meaning-making function. We have thus directed our analysis to the role that 
intellectual property law can play in shaping that process through regulation of 
an important industry whose products are some of the most immediate means 
whereby people create and communicate meaning, about themselves and 
society. Our proposed design right would extend protection against close 
copies but not against looser forms of borrowing or similarity. It aims to 
promote innovation by allowing fashion producers and consumers to fully 
engage these complementary values of distinctiveness and belonging. 
These coexisting poles provide a key to the social dynamic of innovation. 
What is basic to all innovation is the constant tension and interplay between 
individual distinctiveness embodied in creative work and the relation of that 
work to others, past and present. Whether in books, music, or films, a core 
social dynamic of innovation is the proliferation of difference in deep 
interaction with the impulse to commonality. Especially visible in fashion, this 
dynamic pervades all areas of innovation and is instructive for intellectual 
property. 
Our analysis of fashion puts into relief the contours of an important fight in 
innovation policy. New copying technology alters the dynamics of innovation. 
In recent years, we have seen how digital file sharing of copyrighted music has 
changed the economics of that industry. The same is increasingly true of 
movies and other video content. In fashion, as in other industries, we see rapid 
copying becoming cheaper and more effective, and tools that enable remixing 
and reuse are becoming more widespread. 
The broad conceptual problem is that the two phenomena of copying and 
remixing have been conflated in the public mind, and proponents of a remix 
culture are reflexively associated with a permissive attitude toward copying.196 
 
195. For an account that emphasizes such waste, understanding fashion as a quest for 
the attainment of personal relative advantage, see ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY 
MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS 158, 196 (2001). 
196. Compare Lawrence Lessig, Essay, In Defense of Piracy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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In part this is because content owners often oppose both kinds of permission—
that is, they oppose both exact copies and subsequent interpretation, homage, 
and mash-up. And to be sure, some scholars and advocates favor both remix 
and free copying. 
Our analysis of fashion here highlights the need for conceptual distinction 
between the two phenomena in the debate about how much intellectual 
property protection we want to have. There is no necessary confluence or 
equation between a broad freedom to engage in reinterpretation and remixing, 
and free rein to make close copies. Here we have emphasized that such 
remixing is important to innovation, and that innovation is enhanced—not 
stymied—by protection against close copies. We believe that the line between 
close copying and remixing, supported by the theory of their differential effects 
on creators’ incentives, represents an often underappreciated but most 
promising and urgent direction for intellectual property today. 
The dynamics of innovation in fashion design is a window to this 
important aspect of innovation generally. Our work here is intended to help 
ensure that free interpretation is preserved, even if free copying is not. 
 
2008, at W3 (arguing in favor of a robust remix right for music and video), with Lessig Blog 
http://lessig.org/blog/2008/10/news_flash_i_dont_defend_pirac.html (Oct. 13, 2008, 16:14 
EST) (“News Flash: I don’t ‘defen[d] piracy’”; “Sorry to disappoint, but my new book, 
Remix, is not ‘A Defense of Piracy,’ whatever the Wall Street Journal’s headline writers 
may think.”). Lessig may have been taken for a defender of piracy not only because of his 
support of remixing, but also because he proposes to legalize file sharing and compensate 
creators by alternate means, such as a government levy on file sharing devices and services. 
See LESSIG, supra note 18, at 271-72. For a full analysis of one such proposal, see WILLIAM 
W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT ch. 
6 (2004) (proposing compensation system whereby users buy the right to freely share files, 
and artists are compensated through a blanket licensing procedure). HEMPHILL & SUK 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 4/25/2009 2:12 PM 
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197. Adventures in Copyright Infringement, Part Six, FASHIONISTA, Apr. 12, 2007, 
http://fashionista.com/2007/04/ adventures_in_copyright_infrin_3.php (Foley & Corinna and 
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198. Dorielle Hammonds, We Love: Forever 21, LA2DAY, Aug 12, 2008, 
http://www.la2day.com/fashion/we_love_forever_21 (Jonathan Saunders and Forever 21 
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199. Profils d’hiver, L’OFFICIEL DE LA MODE, Sept. 1992, at 210, 211 (Yves Saint 
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